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ABSTRACT 
 
A CASE STUDY USING PRINCIPAL - AGENT THEORY TO EXPLORE HOW A 
PUBLIC, FOUR YEAR UNIVERSITY INTERACTS WITH A SYSTEM OFFICE 
by 
Anaraquel Macias 
Dr. Mario Martinez, Dissertation Committee Chair 
Professor of Higher Education Leadership 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
 
The focus of this research was to examine the funding relationship between a 
single public institution of higher education and its accompanying system office.  Such a 
study is important in order to obtain insight into the relationship between a System Office 
and an institution, and thus how institutions carry out their fiscal responsibilities, not 
directly to the state but to the System Office they serve.  The study provides insight into 
how the System Office communicates and transacts with an institution regarding 
financial allocations.  Also important is whether that institution receives effective 
communication and whether the institution’s perceived expectations are as the System 
Office intended. Finally, the study is significant because it provides insight into whether 
the institution is fulfilling the expectations of the System Office and uncovering potential 
reasons why these expectations are or are not being met. 
The research approach adopted in this dissertation includes a qualitative research 
approach.  Since one of the aims of this study was to initiate research about the 
relationship between an institution and the System Office to which it reports, an 
exploratory single case study design is an appropriate method of inquiry. This single case 
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study examined the relationship between one public institution of higher education and 
the System Office to which it reports.  The relationship between the two organizations is 
the unit of analysis. The case is bounded by context through the funding interactions 
between the institution and System Office.  Principal Agent Theory was selected in order 
to construct a rigorous case study and to define the unit of analysis and conceptual 
framework.  Principal Agent Theory provided insight into how the institution carried out 
its duties as an agent for the principal (System Office); and how the System Office as a 
principal managed its relationship with the agent (campus). Specifically, the study 
investigated the relationship between the California State University System Office and 
one campus of the California State University system within the context of funding 
processes. Funding processes between the system and the campus includes how funds are 
allocated and the expectations and goals that accompany such allocations.  
The results of this study can serve as a reference for college researchers, 
organizations, finance administrators, policy analysts, and state legislators to gain a better 
understanding of how the relationship between System Offices and institutions can be 
enhanced to more effectively and efficiently utilize public resources.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the United States fell into an economic recession. As with previous 
recessions, funding for state higher education soon declined (Hovey, 1999). Finance 
related studies of higher education cite several key elements responsible for this decline 
in funding (Layzell, 2007; SHEEO, 2009; NCLS, 2009; NASBO, 2009), but the most 
common is that policymakers view higher education funding as discretionary in 
comparison to other needed public services and programs (Hovey, 1999). Elected 
officials often feel that colleges and universities can find other sources of revenue, such 
as tuition, to compensate for reduced state support.  This is noticeable in that state 
allocations to higher education represented 11.8% of state general funds spending in 
fiscal year 2005 (National Association of State Budget Officers [NASBO], 2006), but fell  
to 9% in 2009. This reduction in state spending on higher education between 2005 and 
2009 is largely attributed to the national economic crisis (NASBO, 2009).  This 
proportion has declined over time because of pressures from Medicaid and to a lesser 
extent, K-12 education.  Elected officials understand that there are no optional sources of 
funding for public services such as Medicaid, K-12 education, the correctional system or 
highway infrastructure other than state appropriations  and thus higher education funding 
is typically reduced (National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2009).  
Economic uncertainty coupled with historically fluctuating levels of state 
appropriations for higher education and the need to keep education affordable, has caused 
institutions, system offices, state legislators and think-tank organizations to launch 
sophisticated efforts to explore new and creative ideas for addressing funding issues. The 
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Lumina Foundation has focused on new ways of structuring and delivering higher 
education so institutions are better equipped to service the increased number of students 
moving through the educational pipeline (Lumina Foundation newsletter, August 2010). 
In January 2010, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) 
reported in their annual policy brief that one of the top 10 policy issues for 2010 is the  
fiscal crises facing the states and that the lack of funding creates an opportunity to change 
how campuses operate (AASCU, 2010). The Delta Cost Project initiative focuses on cost 
effectiveness and increasing productivity in higher education with particular attention to 
the development of data-driven ways to improve accountability for college and university 
spending (Delta Project, 2010). The research agendas and initiative efforts of these 
organizations serve as additional evidence for the need to delve deeper into higher 
educational funding issues in order to understand which funding programs, transactions 
and policies are effective and where there is need for improvement. 
While research on state level higher education funding has received much 
attention over the years (Layzell, 2003; McLendon, 2003; Hossler, 2004; Institute for 
Higher Education Leadership and Policy [IHELP], 2011), research studies examining 
relationships below the state level are sorely lacking.  For example, how do governing 
boards or system offices allocate funding among the different institutions they oversee?  
Do such funding choices mirror state level allocation methodologies, or are they entirely 
different?  How do institutions allocate resources from a central entity other than the 
state?  These are just some of the questions that arise—and that are worth examining—in 
a time of funding crisis.  
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To initiate research in this area, this study will explore via a qualitative single 
case study the funding allocations and budgeting processes between a single California 
State University (CSU) institution and the system office to which it reports, called the 
California State University System Office.  In the CSU system, the CSU System Office is 
responsible for overseeing the allocation of funds to the campuses from California lottery 
proceeds to fund instruction, academic support and institutional support; and in the form 
of student fees related to system-wide initiatives.  This study aims to understand if a 
contract and/or agreement exists dictating how the system office makes allocations to the 
institutions and if there are a set of expectations connected to such funding allocations 
that the institutions must meet.  
The study will utilize Principal Agent Theory in order to construct a rigorous case 
study and to define the unit of analysis and conceptual framework (Yin, 1981). Principal-
Agent theory explains how to best organize relationships.  The theory states that a 
principal (system office) determines the work and the agent (institution) undertakes the 
work with the expectation that the agent will make decisions that are in the best interest 
of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989).  In return, the agent 
and the principal make an agreement outlining how much payment or resources will be 
given to the agent for the effort necessary to complete the task. This agreement is usually 
in the form of a contract. The agreement or contract is the unit of analysis present for a 
principal-agent relationship to exist.  
The experiences of institutional and system office finance administrators, as 
representatives of the organizations, documents and organizational artifacts, will serve as 
the vehicle to examine the funding allocation methods of the two organizations.  The 
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funding allocations and budget processes agreement or contract between the two 
organizations will be the unit of analysis for this study per the Principal Agent Theory. 
Problem Statement 
 Currently, very little research exists on the dynamics of funding between 
institutions and the local entities to whom they report. These local entities are not state 
level boards; rather, they are commonly known as governing boards or board of trustees.  
The 2008 recession simply confirmed the well-established pattern that state higher 
education funding declines during difficult economic times. However, there is a need to 
understand how funding and allocation decisions take place between institutions and the 
entities to whom they directly report. In this study, the entity will be a system office that 
governs twenty-three public institutions.  An investigation into the funding and allocation 
dynamic between a system office and an institution provides a starting point by which to 
understand how to optimize the funding goals between these two entities.  There is little 
to no investigations conducted through an economic and political framework currently 
exists.  
Purpose of the Study 
This is an exploratory single case study examining the relationship between one 
public institution and the system office it reports to through an examination of their 
funding allocation and budget processes and expectations.  The case study will be bound 
by the institution-system office funding allocation and budget process. In this study, 
Principal Agent Theory will provide insight into how the institution carries out its duties 
as an agent for the principal (system office); and how the system office as a principal 
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manages its relationship with the agent (institution). Specifically, the study will 
investigate the relationship between the California State University System Office and 
one of the California State University institutions hereby referred to as campus within the 
context of funding allocation and budget processes. Funding and budget processes 
between the system and the institution include how funds are allocated from the system 
office to the institutions and the expectations and goals that accompany such allocations. 
For purposes of this study, units related to audits and expenditure control will not be 
explored. 
Conceptual framework 
This qualitative research study uses an exploratory, single case study approach 
method.  The Principal Agent Theory is used as a framework to examine the research 
questions.  According to Creswell (2007), case study research involves the study of an 
issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system. In this study, the 
relationship between two entities is explored through their funding allocation process as 
the bounded system to the case study.  
In case study research, the role of theory is to assist in the design of research steps 
according to some relationship to the literature or substantive source (Yin, 1981a, 1981b). 
Principal Agent Theory (also known as Agency Theory) began in the field of economics 
(Eisenhardt, 1985). PAT provides a structure for research that seeks to understand a 
relational phenomenon between two entities. In this relationship, one entity takes an 
authoritative role (principal) and the other a subordinate role (agent). Further, some sort 
of contractual agreement exists between the two entities (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In figure 1, 
the contractual agreement area is where the two organizations in this study enter into a 
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PAT relationship. The main purposes of the contractual agreement are: a) outlining the 
tasks for the agent and b) introducing the means through which the agent will be 
compensated (Perrow, 1986).  Based on these roles, the contract can be likened to an 
instrument that enables different forms of cooperation and control between the principal 
and the agent. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of Principal Agent Theory (PAT) Model. Contract 
components: principal will oversee funding allocations and set expectations and 
agent will report information on set expectations and perform/report task. 
In higher education, public institutions were formed and funded by the state 
governments to fulfill the needs of society to create, preserve, and transmit knowledge 
(Lane, 2008).  In order to empower the institution to fulfill its mission, the government or 
system office typically appropriates or allocates funds to the institutions. In PAT, this 
would create an implied contractual agreement between the system office and the 
institution (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). Other implied contractual agreements exist between 
government and the system office that may restrict how the system office allocates funds 
System Office 
(Principal) 
    Contract 
components 
Institution  
 
(Agent) 
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to institutions (McLendon, 2003).   This phenomenon although not the main purpose of 
this study may be explored and addressed if discovered through the interview process. 
Principal Agent Theory is an appropriate guide for this research because the 
system office has authority over the institutions it manages.  The system office in this 
study is therefore a principal in the superior role who allocates resources and 
responsibilities to an institution.  The institution is the agent in a subordinate role and 
tasked with the responsibilities of utilizing the resources the system office allocates to it 
in the most efficient and effective manner possible.   
Previous researchers (Gerth, 2010; Wellman, 2008) pointed to policy and political 
issues that affected the funding allocation processes between centralized system offices 
and institutions.  Until now, few, if any, studies looked at the funding allocation process 
between system offices and institutions to understand the dynamics of the interactions 
and transactions between these two subjects. 
Need for the Study 
Although state-level funding research is established in the literature, there is a 
deficiency in research that seeks to understand the complexity of the funding allocation 
processes between an institution and the system office to which it reports. Few studies 
(Liefner, 2003; Gornitzka, 2004; Kivisto, 2007, 2008) have explored relationships in 
higher education using the Principal Agent conceptual lens. Until now, no study has 
researched the relationship between an institution and the accompanying system office, 
under the umbrella of funding and resource allocation.  Also, no previous study has 
looked at the expectations the system office may have for the institution when allocating 
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funds. McLendon (2003) points outs that most higher education political studies examine 
the relationship between state executives and/or legislators (principals) and state higher 
education boards (agents); but he recommends that additional studies shift the level of 
analysis down to the board (principal) – university (agent) relationship. This study fulfills 
that recommendation. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is significant in that it explores and provides insight into the 
relationship between a system office and an institution, and how the institution carries out 
its fiscal responsibilities to the system office it serves.  This study provides insight into 
how a system office communicates and transacts with an institution regarding funding 
allocations.  Also important is whether that institution receives effective communication 
from the system office and whether the institution’s perceived expectations are as the 
system office intended. Finally, this study is significant because it provides insight into 
whether or not the institution is fulfilling the expectations of the system office, and if not, 
it endeavors to uncover potential reasons why these expectations are not being met. 
The results of this study can serve as a reference for college researchers, 
organizations, finance administrators, policy analysts, and state legislators to gain a better 
understanding of how the relationship between system offices and institutions can be 
enhanced to more effectively and efficiently utilize public resources.  
Research Questions 
The research questions for this study are as follows:  
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1. What expectations does the System office have of the institutions to which it 
allocates funds? 
2. Does an institution perceive that the System Office has attached expectations to 
the funds that it allocates to the institutions? 
3. What insights does Principal Agent Theory provide about the relationship 
between the System Office and institutions with respect to funding allocation as it 
flows from the System Office to the institution? 
a. From the principal (System Office) and agent (institution) perspective, does a 
contract with respect to funding exist between the two organizations?  
b. From the principal (System Office) perspective, are the agents (institutions) 
fulfilling their contracts?  
c. From the agent’s (institutions’) perspective, are they fulfilling their 
contractual duty? 
Assumptions 
Since there is limited literature on exactly how the funding relationship works 
between an institution and the system office to which it reports, the following assumption 
is necessary to conduct the study: Institutional and system office finance administrators, 
through their roles, are qualified representatives to describe the relationship between the 
two organizations as it relates to funding allocation. 
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Limitations 
Because this study is qualitative, the findings cannot be generalized to all 
institutions that have a relationship with a centralized system office. However, the 
findings contribute to the current literature on funding issues in higher education. The 
exclusive use of Principal Agent Theory (PAT) as a conceptual lens presents limitations 
due to the inherent assumption that goal incongruity exists because an agent (institution) 
will act selfishly and behave in its best interest with regard to any contracts with the 
principal (system office).  If there is goal alignment between the two organizations, 
Agency Theory offers little explanation concerning behaviors after this alignment of 
goals is achieved. In cases of goal alignment, Agency Theory may conclude that the 
agent must be given a higher incentive to perform, but does not address cases in which 
actual goals are aligned but perceived goals are different. 
Delimitations 
This study will be delimited by the following parameters: 
1. Participants in this study will be delimited to finance administrators at the 
institution level and at the system office. 
2. The institution in this study will be delimited to a four-year public institution 
in California and a member of the California State University System.  
3. This study focuses on finance administrators’ perceptions of their roles in 
funding allocation transactions and the expectations connected to those 
allocations between a single institution and system office, not including other 
institutions within the system. There are twenty-three universities that report 
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to the California State University (CSU) system office, but the methodological 
approach to the study necessitates the focus on only one institution. 
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions are provided to clarify terms used throughout the study: 
Agent: refers to the person or organization who makes a transaction on behalf of 
his or her employer (principal) (Eisenhardt, 1985). 
Discretionary spending: refers to spending set on a yearly basis by decision of 
Congress and is part of fiscal policy. This spending is optional and in contrast to 
entitlement programs for which funding is mandatory (Mandal, 2007). 
Principal: refers to a person or organization who enters into a transaction with 
another person (agent) in an authoritative role (Eisenhardt, 1985). 
Public Institution/Universities: Public institutions are established either by state 
constitution or by statute, and they receive funding from state appropriations as well as 
tuition and endowments. The term "public" indicates that the university's funding comes 
partly from state taxpayers (Colish, 1997). 
Public multi-campus systems: are defined as groups of public institutions, each 
with its own mission, academic programs, internal governing policies and procedures 
(Johnstone, 1993) 
System Office (System Office): are defined as centralized offices in charge of a 
group of colleges and/or universities. System offices work closely with state legislatures 
to carry out state mandates to higher education.  The system offices oversee and carry out 
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policy development, review financial requests and budget proposals, and work closely 
with the institutions to allocate funds, approve new programs or make changes in existing 
programs of instruction (Johnstone, 1993).  
Summary 
This chapter provided the purpose of the study, its significance, limitations and 
delimitations.  The second chapter reviews literature related to higher education funding 
and principal agent theory. The third chapter details the methodological plan for 
executing the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The funding allocation processes between a system office and a single public 
institution are the focus of this study and the literature review that supports it.  Although 
the main focus is funding allocation, five additional topics were identified to provide 
context for this study’s inquiry: higher education funding structures, state and federal 
funding issues, system and institutional funding and oversight issues, an overview of 
California higher education and funding, and the theoretical framework that guides this 
study. 
The first section is an overview of the many funding mechanisms for higher 
education institutions, with a focus on state and federal sources.  The examination of state 
and federal funding is of particular interest since the majority of institutional funding 
derives from these two sources.  The second section covers current funding issues and 
trends, which provides a sense of the fiscal landscape upon which institutions are 
currently operating.   
The third section covers issues of funding and oversight at the system level and 
presents actual examples of system-wide oversight initiatives. This section also presents a 
review of the literature concerning institutional budgeting. Since this study focuses on a 
single institution in California, section four includes a brief history of the state’s higher 
education funding to situate the study. 
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The final section reviews literature on the Principal-Agent theory (PAT).  The 
origins and elements of Principal-Agent theory as well as other concepts and insights that 
form the study framework are discussed in this section. A background of Principal-Agent 
theory, including the development of its components, the assumptions of the theory, and 
its limitations are also highlighted.  
Understanding Higher Education Funding 
Public higher education is a state agency.  Unlike other agencies in state 
government, higher education institutions have a unique and complex array of funding 
sources.  Funding in higher education generally refers to the allocation of a combination 
of funds to public institutions. These funds come from a myriad of sources such as tuition 
and fees, private donations, federal grants, student aid and state appropriations (Layzell, 
2007).   
Tuition is comprised of monies received from students as well as state and federal 
financial aid. Student aid is driven by the number of students enrolled who meet the 
criteria to qualify for financial aid, grants, and loans.  Donations and research and service 
grants are based on the efforts of each institution to secure private funding through 
foundations or individual sources, and to apply for and receive federal funding 
opportunities. State appropriations are dictated by each state’s unique combination of 
policy choices: fiscal, political and environmental conditions provide the context within 
which higher education funding occurs (Layzell, 2007). Table 1 provides a summary of 
public higher education funding types and their corresponding sources.  
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Table 1 
Higher Education Funding Structure. (Source: Layzell, D. T. (2007). State Higher 
Education Funding Models: an Assessment of Current and Emerging Approaches. The 
Journal of Education Finance. 33 (1), 1-19, Summer 2). 
Higher Education Funding Structure 
 
Funding Type Funding source Distribution Mechanism 
Tuition and Fees Students and Parents Directly pay to institution 
 
Student Aid Federal, state, private Directly pay to institution via federal lending 
process, grants, loans, private scholarships 
 
State 
Appropriations 
State government Incremental budgeting, funding formulas, 
performance-based funding, performance 
contracting, and vouchers. 
 
Federal Research 
Grants 
Federal Government Directly pay to a department, project, indirect cost 
to institution 
 
Donations Private donations: 
foundations, individuals 
Directly pay to institution and/or system 
  
Distribution Mechanism for Funding Higher Education 
Some states rely on funding formulas driven by enrollment numbers while others 
use performance-based funding driven by performance indicators, and still others work 
with voucher programs and contracting (Layzell, 2007). There are other approaches to 
funding public higher education which include direct negotiations with institutions or 
systems, or looking at previous allocations and adding an increment to that base for 
inflation or enrollment growth. Regardless of the specific method, state appropriations 
are usually the largest funding source for institutions.  In 1982, state and local 
governments provided $23.5 billion in direct support for the general operating expenses 
of public and private higher education institutions (though private institutions receive a 
nominal amount of monies from state sources). This investment increased to $42.1 billion 
in 1991, $67.8 billion in 2001, $83.5 billion in 2007, and $88.7 billion by 2008 (State 
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Higher Education Executive Officers [SHEEO], 2007; SHEEO, 2009).  In early 2008, the 
economic recession began, drastically reducing state revenue and ending the growth in 
state and local support achieved in earlier years. In February of 2009, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) helped to stabilize state support of education, 
among other interventions, with one time funds.  In 2009, state and local support, 
including ARRA replacement funds, totaled $88.8 billion, which was not a significant 
change from 2008 (State Higher Education Executive Officers [SHEEO], 2007; SHEEO, 
2009).  
Funding Formulas 
Public colleges and universities in some states receive some or all of their funding 
through mathematical algorithms known as funding formulas or guidelines.  Some of 
these formulas are very simple calculations which provide a set dollar  amount per full-
time equivalent (FTE) student; other formulas are more complex and use cost drivers to 
account for instruction, research, public service, and other programmatic costs (Layzell, 
2007). Funding formulas emerged in higher education in the 1950s (McKeown & 
Layzell, 1994), and most recent counts suggest that approximately 38 states utilize this 
type of approach for funding (MGT of America, 2006) to some degree.  
Incremental Funding 
Incremental funding, or baseline budgeting, is a budget developed by either 
decreasing or increasing the previous year’s budget. Incremental budgeting is based on 
projected changes in operations and conditions, and the budget is adjusted to account for 
these changes. This approach tends to lead to budgetary increases over time, as it uses the 
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previous year’s budget as a starting point for the coming year, and often relies on line-
item allocations which stipulate the use of internal funding.  Most states have a 
component of incremental budgeting to account for inflation (Orr, 2005; Layzell, 2007). 
Performance Funding 
Performance funding can be defined as linking state allocations to predetermined 
levels of campus achievement based on prescribed indicators (e.g., freshman-to-
sophomore retention rates, minority student enrollment rates) in a direct and formulaic 
manner (e.g., if a public institution achieves the prescribed targets or performance levels 
for the indicators, it receives a designated amount of state funding). This method serves 
as a mechanism to increase accountability and improve institutional performance (Burke 
& Serban, 1998).  Alexander (2000) notes that performance funding links institutional 
outcome measures to financial resources by means of internal budgetary process, annual 
funding or performance-based measurements. 
At the state level, three types of performance funding systems are used to initiate 
and implement this method (Serban & Burke, 1998):  
 Mandated/Prescribed:  This method is considered the least effective method due 
to the prescribed nature of the process and that it is initiated and dictated by the 
state legislature.  The Legislature determines the indicators, sets the timing for 
when institutions and systems will adhere to the set indicators, as well as 
imposing the methodology for funding on the higher education system. 
 Mandated/Not prescribed: The initiation of the program is dictated by the 
legislature, but the legislature does not determine the performance indicators or 
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timing of the implementation.  This method permits governing and/or state-level 
boards and campus leaders to coordinate how performance will be measured and 
negotiate an implementation timetable and approach. 
 Not mandated: A governing and/or state-level board or system office will initiate 
dialogue and a plan to adopt a new program, working in collaboration with 
campus officials to design and implement the program without legislative 
mandate. The legislature acts more as an advisee to the governing board efforts, 
reviewing and providing feedback, and it becomes a partner in the development 
and implementation of the new program. This is considered the most effective 
method for the adoption and implementation of performance-based funding.  
State performance funding programs for higher education have been in place 
since the late 1970s.  In 2003, 15 states reported using performance funding programs 
(Burke & Minassians, 2003). The amounts allocated through these programs have 
typically been a small proportion (e.g., less than 5%) of the overall state higher education 
budget (Layzell, 2007). 
Performance Contracting  
Performance contracting is an agreement between the state and institution that 
affords the institution a set level of funding in exchange for a particular service or 
performance. States, through regional compacts such as the Western Interstate 
Commission for Higher Education, Southern Regional Education board, and others, have 
used the contracting approach to secure a number of enrollment spaces in professional 
programs (e.g., medicine, veterinary medicine)  (Layzell, 2007).  During the 2003 
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legislative session, the University of Florida and Florida State University proposed a new 
funding method based on five-year performance contracts.  Under this proposal, these 
two universities received the authority to set tuition as well as a lump-sum funding 
amount reliant upon meeting set performance measurement.  The Florida legislature 
instructed the Council for Education Policy, Research and Improvement (CEPRI) to 
study the feasibility of the proposed contract to include five universities in total.  CEPRI 
supported the plan and proposed the expansion of the proposal to all Florida universities, 
though no formal action was taken on the proposal (Breneman, 2004). 
Vouchers 
Under a voucher model, public colleges and universities do not receive a direct 
institutional subsidy from the state. Rather, each eligible in-state resident admitted to a 
public college or university receives a voucher or stipend to apply toward the cost of 
attendance. This approach is similar to that which is already used by many states when 
allocating student financial aid awards. The major difference is that most or all state 
support is allocated as part of a voucher model. This gives public colleges and 
universities the authority to set student tuition and fee levels without first securing state 
approval or requiring legislative oversight. In 2004, this model was implemented in 
Colorado through the state's College Opportunity Fund (COF).  The underlying 
philosophy behind the voucher approach is to improve educational quality and efficiency 
through competition for student enrollment. In theory, increasing student choice through 
vouchers gives institutions a competitive focus and encourages them to differentiate 
themselves according to quality, cost, and program offerings (Layzell, 2007).  In 2008, as 
part of the Lumina Foundation funded evaluation called the Opportunity Grant Program, 
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the COF voucher program in Colorado was reported as an “inadequate replacement for 
General Fund appropriations per Full Time Equivalent (FTE) student.”  The report 
suggested that the funds in actuality, do not go directly to the students and that the award 
did not cover in-state tuition. The report also said that it is difficult for institutions to 
predict revenue without accurate enrollment and the program is difficult to administer 
(Lumina Foundation, 2009). 
State Compact 
A state compact model requires a system of institutions to identify, negotiate and 
agree on funding plans and then, as a collective, present the agreed upon budget request 
as a cohesive unit to the state (Martinez & Richardson, 2009). This model is primarily 
used in California by the Regents of the University of California (UC). The UC system 
utilizes this model and sets priorities that guide the campuses, Chancellors and Vice-
Chancellors during budget development.  The agreement or compact that is developed by 
the Regents, Chancellor, and campuses is provided to the Governor as a budget request.  
This section has provided an overview of funding types, available sources of 
funding, and methods of funding distribution utilized in higher education.  The next 
section will detail current fiscal issues at the state and federal level in order to provide 
some context for system and institutional funding issues currently in place. The 
subsequent section will provide an overview of the California Higher Education system 
and its funding. 
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The Current Shape of State Funding 
Not surprisingly, funding for state institutions of higher learning tends to be 
greatly influenced by the overall fiscal health of the state. During robust economic times, 
higher education directly benefits from larger state revenue collections, and conversely, 
funding for higher education is disproportionally lowered when state fiscal conditions are 
weak (National Conference of State Legislatures [NCLS], 2009).  Higher education is 
usually considered the largest discretionary spending line item in the state budget. 
Elected state officials often view allocations for higher education as discretionary 
especially when compared to other needed state services and programs.  Logically then, 
colleges and universities must find other sources of income, such as tuition and 
donations, to compensate for reduced state support. Obviously, this is not an option 
available to other state services such as the correctional system, Medicaid or K-12 
education. As a result, fluctuations in state fiscal conditions can have a tremendous 
impact on institutions of higher learning (NCSL, 2009). 
On a national average, state allocations to higher education represented 11.8% of 
state general funds spending in fiscal year 2005 (National Association of State Budget 
Officers [NASBO], 2006); these allocations fell to 9% in 2009. The reduction between 
2005 and 2009 is largely attributed to the national economic turndown (NASBO, 2009).  
Although this proportion has declined over time due to pressures from Medicaid and to a 
lesser extent, K-12 education, higher education still represents a significant portion of 
state spending.  The pressures from Medicaid will continue; NASBO estimates that for 
fiscal year 2010, Medicaid will constitute the largest share of state general fund spending 
due to increased cases resulting from the economic decline (NASBO, 2010). As Figure 2 
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shows below, in fiscal year 2009, 35.8 percent of general fund spending went to 
elementary and secondary education. Medicaid accounted for 15.7 percent of the general 
fund and higher education accounted for 11.5 percent (note that the previously cited 9% 
is a state average, compared to the 11.5% total allocation portion for higher education 
across the states; this is at a national average level) (NASBO, 2010). The economic 
recession and stagnated state revenues indicate a future of very little growth, and in many 
states, continued cuts in state appropriations for higher education (Layzell, 2007).  
 
Figure 2. Percentage State General Funds Expenditures, Fiscal Year 2009. Source: 
National Association of State Budget Officers (2010) 
Federal Assistance from American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (AARR) 
In February 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) to help stimulate the national economy. Congress provided federal funds to 
states in order to help stabilize support for key programs, including higher education for 
Fiscal Years (FY) 09, 10, and 11. Even though AARR monies were allocated, 23 out of 
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50 states reported funding decreases from FY 2009 levels. Eight states reported drops of 
more than 5 percent. (NASBO, 2010). 
A report by the National Conference of State Legislatures (2010) in its findings 
for fiscal year 2010, included the following information on the impact of AARR funds: 
 Thirty-nine of the 46 reporting states used fiscal stabilization funds to support 
higher education, resulting in a 2.3 percent increase in year-over-year higher 
education funding. Without ARRA, funding would have decreased 2.5 percent. 
 Even with the ARRA money, 23 states reported funding decreases from FY 2009 
levels, with eight states reporting drops of more than 5 percent. Hawaii and Idaho 
reported declines of more than 10 percent. 
 The use of ARRA funds had a significant impact in FY 2010, raising higher 
education funding levels by more than 5 percentage points in 19 states. In six of 
those states, the percentage point difference was especially notable: Montana 
(18.6 percentage points), Nevada (14.8 percentage points), Ohio (12.5 percentage 
points), Iowa (11.5 percentage points), Louisiana (11 percentage points) and 
South Carolina (10.3 percentage points). 
Due to current fluctuations in state funding and the impact of AARR, many states 
have cut higher education programs and services. North Carolina, for example, 
eliminated or reduced programs that were considered “not core” to the mission of higher 
education. South Dakota’s higher education board identified 37 academic programs and 
109 specializations within academic majors for termination due to low enrollments. 
Tennessee and Washington stepped up efforts to review funding, operational efficiency 
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and tuition policies. Florida tightened residency requirements, making it harder to qualify 
for in-state tuition, and California actively sought to decrease student enrollment.  
Continued state actions to close budget shortfalls have included staff layoffs, furloughs 
and salary freezes – all actions affecting higher education institutions. In addition, many 
states have authorized tuition and fee increases (NCLS, 2009; NCLS, 2010). 
Economic uncertainty, coupled with a history of fluctuating levels of state 
appropriations for higher education and the need to keep it affordable, has caused 
institutions, system offices, state legislators and think-tank organizations to launch 
sophisticated efforts to explore new and creative ideas for addressing funding issues. 
Recently, the Lumina Foundation has focused on new methods for the structure and 
delivery of higher education so institutions are better equipped to handle an increased 
number of students (Lumina Foundation newsletter, August 2010). In January 2010, the 
American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) reported in their 
annual policy brief that one of the top 10 policy issues for 2010 is the  fiscal crises facing 
the states and how the lack of funding creates an opportunity to change how campuses 
operate (AASCU, 2010). The Delta Cost Project initiative focuses on cost effectiveness 
and increasing productivity in higher education with particular attention to the 
development of data-driven ways to improve accountability for college and university 
spending (Delta Project, 2010). 
The research agendas and initiative efforts of these organizations serve as 
additional evidence for the need to delve deeper into higher education funding 
relationships in order to understand what funding programs, transactions and policies are 
effective and where there is need for improvement. 
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System Level Oversight 
Most public higher education institutions operate under the auspices of a system 
office.  A system office is spearheaded by a chancellor, who is either appointed or elected 
by a state level governance board.  A chancellor of a system of institutions brings policy 
recommendations to the state governance board, and possesses the authority to implement 
the policies of the Board through his leadership of the Chancellor's System Office.  The 
Chancellor and the Presidents of each campus collaboratively work toward setting system 
level goals and priorities, and preparing the state higher education budget request.  The 
state legislature reacts to what the system and institutions provide and either accepts, cuts 
or negotiates a new plan (Layzell & Lyddon, 1990).  
System level governance and oversight takes center stage on a regular basis 
through efforts to establish better programs for efficiencies and effectiveness, 
accountability and performance, and policy development. In addition to oversight, the 
system office provides centralized services to institutions within the system (Gerth, 
2010).  For example, in the California State University (CSU) system, the System Office 
oversees and provides an Enterprise Common Management System (ECMS) to support 
human resources, financial, and student services computing functions for all 23 CSU 
campuses. The ECMS is comprised of a common suite of Oracle Enterprise applications 
hosted in a shared data center, with a supported data warehouse infrastructure 
(calstate.edu, 2011). 
In Mississippi, the higher education governing board instituted a system-level 
review of spending for administrative and support functions. As a result, the system was 
able to make a number of significant reductions in spending in areas such as energy and 
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purchasing. The system also identified and eliminated institutes and centers that initially 
received state funds as part of a matching grant from an external funder; however, the 
external funds had disappeared while the state funding remained (Wellman, 2008).  
One lesson to be learned from institutions that have successfully worked with 
system-wide initiatives is that it makes a difference if the governing board participates in 
the discussion about setting goals, funding priorities, monitoring performance and 
communicating results to policymakers. Without effective participation, governing 
boards can become part of the funding and cost “problem” by setting agendas that 
increase revenues without paying attention to what they are funding. Including the 
governing board in the conversation also redirects the discussion from a technical and 
functional level to a policy-directed discussion based on strategic priorities. System 
oversight is also crucial when bargaining for funding at the state level because it presents 
a unified political voice when advocating for a group of institutions (Gerth, 2010).  
An appropriate balance of influence is critical to any system's efficiency and 
effectiveness. Too much centralization may lead to missed local opportunities. Too much 
decentralization, however, may yield inefficient duplication of internal activities and 
externally offered services, as well as inattention to critical institutional goals (Cantor & 
Courant, 2003). 
Institutional Budgeting 
Institutional funding actions are centered on budgetary activities and the 
institution’s ability to communicate and set its priorities through the budget process. In a 
public institution, a budget process is both an art and a science (Lasher & Greene, 2001). 
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A well-designed budget will manifest an institution's core mission, its distinctive 
character and its strategic goals (Facione, 2002). 
A budget is defined as “a statement of the financial position of an administration 
for a definite period of time based on estimates of expenditures during the period and 
proposals for financing them; a plan for coordination of resources and expenditures; the 
amount of money available for, required for, or assigned to a particular purpose” 
(Webster New Collegiate Dictionary, 2010; p. 116).  An institutional budget is the result 
of many political battles, replete with offers and counter offers, negotiation and 
compromise (Lasher & Greene, 2001). 
Public institutions use the state’s budget instructions as the basis for the 
development of institution-specific instructions, guidelines and policies.  These 
guidelines indicate that budget development is generally a “top-down” activity, initiated 
from central administration and imposed on departments and units lower in the hierarchy.   
Budget preparation begins at the budgetary units and rises to central administration in a 
“bottom-up” fashion.  This is considered information transfer; however, research shows 
that more information tends to flow upward to central administration than returns to 
subordinate levels (Meisinger & Dubeck, 1984; Lasher & Greene, 2001).  For public 
colleges and universities, the budget cycle takes more time in order to allow for state-
level, and system-level involvement in the process (Meisinger & Dubeck, 1984). 
Massy (1996) details internal institutional allocation schemes, which have much 
in common with how allocation takes place from the state to institutions.  For example, 
within an institution, central administrators may choose to budget and allocate based on 
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incremental line-items.  In this methodology, central administrators specify not only the 
amount of money that can be spent, but also how that money can be spent.  This method 
of budgeting and allocation requires much oversight and grants a large portion of power 
to central administrators.  Block funding provides a lump sum to organizational units, and 
they can choose their priorities and the particulars of how that money will be spent.  
Finally, Massy writes about other market-based approaches to funding at the institutional 
level, with performance responsibility and revenue responsibility.  Performance 
responsibility details how organizational units are rewarded for meeting certain 
performance levels (much like performance funding at the state level).  Revenue 
responsibility explains how each organizational unit is treated as its own profit and loss 
center, and therefore each unit is responsible for its own revenues and its own 
expenditures.  Obviously, revenue responsibility budgeting is more common in private 
institutions. 
According to Bowen (1986), institutions should have strong ties between 
planning, budgetary processes and control processes.  Smart (1993) states the relationship 
between planning and budgeting is confounded by the very nature of planning and the 
number of factors beyond the control of the institution.  Other factors that impact 
institutional budgeting are the uncertain nature of future conditions, difficulties in 
predicting opportunities and threats, the politics of institutional decision making, the 
distribution of power within the institution, the potential rigidness of formal planning 
processes and the time and cost for comprehensive planning (Schmidtlein, 1989). 
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Overview of California Higher Education and its Funding 
It is important to provide an historical context for California higher education 
funding since the focus of this study is the funding allocation processes between a single 
institution of the California State University (CSU) system and the CSU System Office. 
Throughout the twentieth century, public universities were established across the 
United States at a dizzying pace, transforming the scope and purpose of American higher 
education. Leading the way was California, with its internationally renowned network of 
public colleges and universities. In 1862, public postsecondary education began in 
California with the opening of what is now San Jose State (a CSU institution) as a normal 
school. The University of California was created in 1868 and the first junior college 
program began in Fresno in 1910 (Gerth, 2010).  
In 1920, the Legislature abolished local governing boards for its seven normal 
schools and reorganized them under the state Board of Education and the superintendent 
of public instruction, an arrangement that continued until the adoption of the 1960 Master 
Plan. In 1935, normal schools were renamed state colleges and authorized to expand their 
curricula beyond teacher education. By 1959, just before the creation of the Master Plan, 
each of these segments had experienced substantial growth and significant change 
(Richardson, 1997). 
In 1959, when California was experiencing rapid student enrollment growth, some 
community colleges wanted to become four-year universities. Dozens of bills were 
considered by the Legislature to resolve questions such as: where to locate new 
campuses; who should offer professional and graduate training; the admissions 
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requirements for each public segment; and how public segments be coordinated. Over the 
subsequent 18 months, a coalition of educational leaders guided by Clark Kerr, then 
President of the University of California, worked to solve these problems. Additional 
members of the coalition were Roy Simpson, the superintendent of public instruction 
representing the state colleges, and Arthur Coons, president of Occidental College.  
Together they produced the Master Plan for Higher Education, which became law when 
the Governor signed the Donohoe Act in 1960 (Richardson, 1997). With the inception of 
the California Master Plan for Higher Education in 1960, California became the first state 
to develop a coherent public higher education system. It established a tripartite structure 
consisting of the nation’s first network of public community colleges, a set of regional 
teachers’ state colleges and the nation’s first multi-campus state university, the University 
of California (UC). All three systems were linked by matriculation agreements and by a 
process of accreditation (Richardson, 1997; Douglass, 2002). 
California was the largest network of public higher education institutions in terms 
of enrollment and had been a pioneer in the creation of a coherent network of public 
institutions (Gerth, 2010). In the spring of 1960, the California Legislature passed the 
Donahoe Act. The statute contained a number of components from the California Master 
Plan for Higher Education, including stipulations for funding.  The Master Plan also 
included some sixty agreements linking the higher education community with the state 
legislature and the governor's office. Each agreement was intended to help guide the 
expansion of California's tripartite higher education system.  
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This tripartite system includes the California Community Colleges system, the 
California State University system, and the University of California system. The 
following are characteristics of the three systems: 
 The University of California (UC) consists of ten general campuses, five 
medical centers and numerous research facilities. The UC system includes 
more than 220,000 students and more than 170,000 faculty and staff. The 
UC has authority within the public segments to award doctoral degrees 
and exclusive jurisdiction over the professions of law, medicine, dentistry, 
and veterinary medicine (universityofcalifornia.edu, 2010) 
 The California State University (CSU) is composed of 23 campuses. The 
CSU has approximately 433,000 students and 44,000 faculty and staff. 
CSU is authorized to award the doctoral degree jointly with UC or a 
private university. Faculty research is authorized only to the extent that it 
is consistent with the instructional function (calstate.edu, 2010). 
 The California Community Colleges (CCC) are comprised of 72 districts 
with 112 colleges and enroll more than 2.9 million students. California 
Community Colleges provide basic skills education, workforce training 
and courses to prepare students to transfer to four-year universities 
(cccco.edu, 2010).  
 The California Postsecondary Education Commission is the state's primary 
planning and advisory body on higher education. It was established in 
1974 as a citizen board by the Legislature and the Governor to coordinate 
California colleges and universities and to provide independent, non-
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partisan policy analysis and recommendations to the Governor and the 
Legislature. However, the Commission was eliminated in November 2011. 
 The Student Aid Commission administers state and federal financial aid 
programs. 
 The California Postsecondary and Vocational Education Commission 
regulates private higher education institutions. 
The California State University System Leadership 
The 25-member Board of Trustees, the majority of whom are appointed by the 
governor to eight-year terms, are responsible for the oversight of the California State 
University system. Faculty, alumni and two student trustees serve two-year terms. The 
California Governor is designated as the President of the Board, the General Counsel 
serves as Secretary, and the Chief Financial Officer as Treasurer. Other officers, 
including the board's chair and vice chair, are elected by board members for one-year 
terms. 
The CSU Board of Trustees adopts rules, regulations, and policies governing the 
California State University. The board has authority over curricular development, use of 
property, development of facilities, and fiscal and Human Resources management. The 
CSU Board of Trustees meets six times per year. Board meetings allow for 
communication among the trustees, Chancellor, campus presidents, executive committee 
members of the statewide Academic Senate, representatives of the California State 
Student Association, and officers of the statewide Alumni Council.  
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The trustees appoint the Chancellor, the system’s chief executive officer, and the 
presidents, the chief executive officers on their respective campuses who report to the 
Chancellor. The trustees, Chancellor and presidents develop system-wide policy, with 
campus implementation taking place through broadly based consultative procedures. The 
Office of the Chancellor secures the CSU general fund and capital outlay budgets and 
coordinates system-wide efforts in areas such as technology, academic affairs, business 
affairs, institutional research, physical plant development, employee relations, state and 
federal governmental affairs, legal affairs, university advancement, and public affairs 
(Gerth, 2010; calstate.edu, 2012). 
Higher Education Funding in California 
California uses incremental budgeting, funding formulas, compacts and 
guarantees. California does not use performance funding at the statewide level, 
performance contracting or vouchers.  California’s education funding comes from the 
state’s general fund and can be volatile and unstable due to the fact that it is tied to 
property and income taxes (Richardson & Martinez, 2009).  
Future budgeting for the system is made even more difficult by the voting 
decisions of the California electorate. Proposition 13, passed in date, reduced local 
property taxes by 57 percent and effectively destroyed the power of local government to 
raise ad valorem taxes. Other initiatives came after Proposition 13 indexing the income 
tax and abolishing the state inheritance tax.  The passage of Proposition 98 required that 
at least 40 percent of general fund revenues to go to public schools with a portion set 
aside for the California Community Colleges (CCC). Six-year term limits for the 
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Assembly and eight-year limits for the Senate were passed in 1990 which requires new 
members to get up to speed on funding issues at the beginning of their terms. In 1994, 
voters passed a "Three Strikes" initiative, which placed additional demands on the state 
general fund to build, staff, and maintain prisons and judicial systems. In addition, recent 
legislation has allowed people whose property taxes were frozen at 1975 levels by 
Proposition 13 to pass their homes on to their children without reassessment (Richardson, 
1997). 
Other issues affecting the State of California budget are related to the auto-pilot 
budgeting nature of some state programs and the federal government deficit. Auto-
piloting refers to budget guarantees. For example, along with the Proposition 98 funding 
guarantee for K-14 education, many areas of the budget require some level of statutory or 
operational (caseload) funding. Agencies that are predicated on caseload funding include 
health and human services programs, state prison programs, and federally and state 
mandated natural resources monitoring and improvement. While increased funding for 
these programs is not specifically mandated by law, limiting funding for them is not 
practical and can have severe ramifications.   
Another issue affecting state financing is the federal government’s struggle with a 
large budget deficit. As a result, officials in Washington D.C. are examining ways to 
reduce spending, one of which is reducing allocations to states and localities. (CA post-
secondary commission, 2007). 
California Higher Education Review Efforts 
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In 1994, the Rand Corporation published an analysis summarizing the fiscal 
environment of California as it struggled to recover from the 90’s recession. In addition 
to the study, educator roundtables were established to discuss the report’s findings. The 
Rand report found that health and welfare, corrections, higher education, and K-12 
education accounted for over 90 percent of state general fund spending. Allocations for 
health and welfare and corrections had risen with few interruptions over the past 25 
years, while those for education had been going down. The report forecast that K-12 
spending would have to grow, leaving no increases for higher education. According to 
the report, by 2002 California State University (CSU) would have to turn away 200,000 
to 300,000 students it would have otherwise admitted. In a separate analysis, David 
Breneman (1998) argued that the Governor should declare a "state of emergency" for 
California higher education and appoint a blue ribbon commission to plan for the future 
of the system. Shortly thereafter, higher education leaders announced the receipt of a 
grant from the Hewlett Foundation to study funding and enrollment in higher education 
(Richardson, 1997).  
In February 2004, in an attempt to cut cost and find efficiencies, Governor 
Schwarzenegger created the California Performance Review, under the leadership of Co-
Executive Directors Billy C. Hamilton and Chon Gutierrez. Over 250 state employees on 
loan from existing state agencies staffed the review. They worked in 14 teams divided 
into seven "functional" areas (e.g., education) and seven cross-cutting areas (e.g., 
procurement, information technology).  The review proposed the elimination of 
approximately 88 boards, including the California Postsecondary Commission for 
Education, which was originally created to serve as a central coordinating and planning 
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body that provided postsecondary education policy analyses and budget 
recommendations to the Legislature and the Governor. 
The year 2010 marked the 50th anniversary of the California Master Plan and one 
of the worst economic years in California history.  Even in the midst of this economic 
turmoil, the percentage of Californians who believe that state funding for public colleges 
and universities is inadequate (74%) has risen 17 points since October 2007. Most (66%) 
think more cuts will affect educational quality (Public Policy Institute of California 
[PPIC], 2010).  
The declining economic situation of the state has brought a renewed focus on 
higher education issues, with many concerned that neglecting higher education will hurt 
the state’s future. Two in three Californians say state spending on higher education 
should be a high or very high priority (up 14 points since 2008). Fifty-seven percent say 
the state should increase spending in this area even at the expense of other programs 
(PPIC, 2010). The recently passed 2010-2011 state budget included more money for the 
three systems, but funding levels still remain below those of just a few years ago. Nearly 
all Californians say that given all of the issues facing the new governor in 2011, planning 
for the future of the state’s higher education system is very important (76%) or somewhat 
important (21%) (PPIC, 2010). 
This overview of California’s higher education funding and the overall 
complexity of funding across institutional, system, and state levels provides more 
evidence for the need to look inside higher education funding to understand which 
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programs, transactions and policies are working, how are they working and how they can 
be improved.    
The next section covers the Principal-Agent Theory, its components and 
applicability for this study. 
Principal-Agent Theory 
Origins 
Principal-Agent theory is also known as Agency theory. The disciplinary origins 
of Agency theory come from economics, more specifically, information economics 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory was developed as a means to investigate more general 
questions of incomplete information and risk sharing (Moe, 1984). Early work on this 
theory centered on dilemmas of dealing with incomplete information in insurance 
industry contracts (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). The theory was soon 
applied more generally to dilemmas associated with contracts in other contexts (Jenson & 
Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1978).  
The development and application of Agency Theory has also been impacted by 
political science. Mitnick (1975) may have been the first scholar outside of the discipline 
of economics to recognize the value of the agency framework. Rose-Ackerman (1978), 
inspired by the works of Ross (1973), distinguished the chain of agency relationships in 
politics-bureaucracy relationships.  Moe (1984) also contributed by analyzing the theory 
in different public sector settings and his article on the new economics of an organization 
was widely cited by scholars in many disciplines (Eggertsson, 1990). 
Definition 
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Principal-Agent theory explains how to best organize relationships. One party (the 
principal) determines the work and another party (the agent) undertakes the work with the 
expectation that the agent will make decisions that are in the best interest of the principal 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989).  In return, the agent and the 
principal make an agreement on how much payment or resources will be given to the 
agent for the effort necessary to complete the task. This agreement is usually in the form 
of a contract. The agreement is the unit of analysis present for a principal-agent 
relationship to exist.  Table 2 provides an overview of the components of the Principal 
Agent Theory in addition to highlighting the human and organizational assumptions that 
arise when a Principal-Agent relationship exists. 
Table 2 
Overview of the Principal-Agent Theory (Source: Eisenhardt, M. K. (1989). Agency 
theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57). 
 
  
Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships reflect how to best organize 
(contract) tasks and activities an agent will complete for a 
principal at a set cost 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest  
Bounded rationality  
Risk aversion  
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants  
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion  
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information Assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problem Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing (shirking) 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have 
partly differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. 
compensation, regulation, leadership, impression 
management, whistle blowing, vertical integration, 
transfer pricing) 
39 
The Principal-Agent Contract 
The contract and/or agreement in the principal-agent relationship is either explicit 
(written document) or implicit (an oral agreement of understanding) and can vary in 
detail. The variation in detail refers to either complete contracts attempting to include all 
tasks, activities and contingencies or, contracts that are incomplete regarding how much 
to specify for every task, activity and potential contingency. 
Two factors contribute to the inability of contracts to be completed. One factor is 
that the principal hires the agent either for tasks the agent does not wish to do or because 
the agent has special skills or knowledge which enables him/her to do the job more 
efficiently than the principal.  Since the principal does not have the specific knowledge as 
to what is necessary to complete the task, it would be impossible for the principal to 
specify in a written or verbal contract all actions required to complete the work (e.g. 
legislators asking the university to educate people and not having familiarity with the 
academic process).  The second factor making a contract incomplete is the inability to 
know all contingencies which may arise in the performance of the job. Any attempt to 
specify all possible actions which might be required would result in high cost in time and 
effort (transaction cost) on the part of the principal. Examples in higher education include 
fluctuating enrollment numbers, unfunded mandates, or catastrophic situations beyond 
the control of the university. An incomplete contract has the advantage of relieving the 
principal of the cost to develop it fully, and allowing both parties some flexibility to 
address future contingencies as they arise without the expense of writing a new contract 
each time, thus reducing transaction cost.  The agent willingly accepts payment as 
compensation for uncertainty caused by the incomplete contract (Simon, 1991). 
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Regardless of how detailed the contract is, the main purposes of the contract are: 
a) outlining the tasks for the agent and b) introducing the means through which the agent 
will be compensated (Perrow, 1986).  Based on these purposes, the contract and agency 
relationship can be understood to be an instrument enabling different forms of 
cooperation and control between the principal and the agent. 
Principal-Agent Relationship 
Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) arises in a business management context and is 
associated with behavioral studies of employer-contractor or employer-employee 
interactions. Although generally applied to an employment situation, it can be applied to 
any contractual relationship such as lawyer-client, where the client is the principal and 
the lawyer is the agent; or manufacture-distributor organizations, in which the distributor 
is the principal and the manufacturer is the agent (Lane, 2008).   
In higher education, public institutions were formed and funded by the state 
governments to fulfill the need of society to create, preserve, and transmit knowledge 
(Lane, 2008).  In order to empower the institution to fulfill its mission, the government or 
system office typically appropriates money to the institution. This is the basis of the 
implied PAT contract; the government or system office provides the resources or pays for 
services provided by the institution (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). In Figure 2, a representation 
of the principal-agent relationship between an institution and the system office is 
illustrated. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of Principal Agent Theory (PAT) Single Agent to Single Principal 
Relationship Model. The contract components denote principal will oversee funding 
allocations and set expectations and agent will report information on set expectations and 
perform/report task. 
Multiple Principal Agent Concept 
Agency relationships can also vary from a single-principal-single-agent 
relationship to more complex multiple-principal-single-agent or single-agent-multiple-
principal relationships (Mason & Slack, 2003).  For example, one dentist (the agent) may 
have a number of patients (principals), one employer (principal) may have multiple 
employees (agents) and one lawyer (agent) may only have one client (principal). 
Principals and agents may also have dual roles in which principals can act simultaneously 
as some other principals’ agents, and agents as some other agents’ principals.  For 
example, legislators are the agents of citizens, but also the principals of government.  
System Office 
(Principal) 
Institution  
(Agent) 
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Likewise, government is the agent of legislators, but also the principal of public agencies 
(Vedung, 1997). 
Institutions of higher education are multi-level organizations in which it is 
sometimes difficult to identify a single principal and agent, and determining multiple 
principals and agents can also be a difficult task.  Alternatively, legislators could be 
considered the principal, and state agencies (in higher education, governing boards or 
system offices responsible for implementing higher education public policy) would then 
be considered the agents.  Citizens could be the principals of the legislators whom they 
elect as illustrated in Figure 4. Preceding one more level, the state agency or system 
office can be considered the principal and the institution the agent.  These examples of 
principal-agent levels demonstrate the existence of multiple principals and/or multiple 
agents who add a layer of complexity to the relationships found in academia. Such 
complexities can create more difficulties when attempting to align principals and agents 
through a contractual agreement (Kivisto & Lane, 2008). 
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Figure 4. Illustration of Multiple Principal Multiple Agent Principal Agent Theory 
Relationship drawn from PAT Literature Review. The arrows denote principal will 
oversee funding allocations and set expectations and agent will report information on set 
expectations and perform/report task. 
The dilemma in this complex relationship lies in how to ensure the desired 
outcome at each level, particularly when taxpayers demand accountability from 
legislators in order for them to be re-elected.  Legislators demand accountability from 
state agencies and governing boards in order to continue to provide support.  Institutions 
are held accountable by various principals: legislators, governing boards and system 
offices must demonstrate the outcomes (access, completion and affordability) of the 
higher education enterprise (Lane, 2008).  
Another dilemma arises when evaluating the multi-faceted product of an 
institution of higher education. Many principal-agent relationships revolve around the 
production of goods, which can be quantified; or center on actions, which can be 
System 
Office 
(Principal/
Agent) 
Institution 
(agent) 
Public 
(Principal) 
Legislature 
(Principal) 
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observed.  Since an institution's work is not regarded as the 'production' of goods, can't be 
quantified, and its actions can't be easily observed, complications can arise in the 
principal-agent relationship (Kivisto & Lane, 2008). 
Assumptions about principal-agent relationships 
Most of the agency literature adopts two very important assumptions concerning 
agency relationships.  There must be (a) informational asymmetries and (b) goal conflicts 
simultaneously present in the agency relationship (e.g. Moe, 1984; Eisenhart, 1989).  The 
existence of these two assumptions in an agency relationship means that an agency 
problem may exist due to discrepancies between the organizations as it relates to 
information and/or a misalignment of goals.  In these cases, PAT provides a framework 
for outlining such assumptions by identifying agents, principals, whether contracts exist, 
and to what extent. 
Informational Asymmetries 
Informational asymmetries are claims that an agent possesses more or better 
information about the details of individual tasks assigned to said agent, as well as the 
agent’s own actions, abilities and preferences (Eggertsson, 1990).  By and large, 
principal-agent relationships tend to assume that agents have an innate tendency to seek 
autonomy from organizational rules, to minimize the burden of discharging 
responsibilities and to hoard rather than pass through information which is considered 
power (Frederickson & Smith, 2003). The assumption is that the principal generally faces 
difficulties in acquiring information possessed by the agent. 
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Agency theory argues that under conditions of incomplete information and 
uncertainty which characterize most business and public settings, two agency problems 
arise: moral hazard and adverse selection.  
Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard can be present anytime two parties come to agreement. Each party 
in a contract may have the opportunity to gain from acting contrary to the guidelines laid 
out by the agreement. The concept of moral hazard was first defined by the French 
economist Drèze in 1961 (Mooney, 1994). It is also referred to as hidden action by 
economists such as Arrow (1985), for the reason that ‘moral hazard’ implies a moral 
failure on the part of individuals, a connotation which is not intended. Research in 
economics generally centers on the condition that the principal cannot be sure if the agent 
has put forth maximal effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, in higher education, 
legislators may not go to the lengths necessary to understand the actual cost involved in 
developing academic programs.  
Additional research (Ross, 1973; Moe, 1984; Lane, 2008) on moral hazard 
describes “shirking” as a typical problem. Shirking is to avoid or neglect a duty or 
responsibility; the act of working less when there is no chance of earning a higher return. 
For example: employees who are paid poorly may shirk their responsibilities since there 
is no incentive rewarding hard work. One of the main purposes of PAT is to solve this 
shirking problem (e.g.., to find instruments that will motivate the agent to behave in the 
principal’s interests) (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). 
Adverse selection  
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Adverse selection is the condition under which the principal cannot ascertain if 
the agent has accurately represented the agent’s ability to do the work for which the agent 
is being paid.  This problem occurs before the principal enters into an agency relationship 
with the agent.  The principal assumes to know the nature of the tasks the agent should 
perform and the abilities needed to perform such tasks successfully (Bergen, 1992).  
However, in situations of adverse selection, problems arise from the principal’s 
uncertainty regarding the agent’s true abilities and intentions.  
Goal Conflicts 
The second assumption is goal conflict. This is the situation in which principals’ 
and agents’ desires and interests concerning the task are in conflict and both prefer a 
different course of action.  The principal’s objective is for the agent to expend as much 
effort as is necessary to complete a task.  Conversely, it is assumed that the agent acts 
with self-interest and will produce at the minimum accepted level to meet the principal's 
expectation unless the agent can increase the economic benefit (Petersen, 1995). Goal 
conflict arises due to the agent’s self-interest and the tendency to maximize or pursue his 
own utility.  Therefore, the principal faces the problem of insuring that the agent 
complies with the contract. The conflicts between principal and agent do not need to be 
permanent or constant, but there must be a certain allowance for them to occur (Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992). An example of a temporary goal conflict between an institution (agent) 
and its legislature (principal) is the University research agenda.  The legislature's 
expectation is that the institution expends more time teaching students rather than 
conducting scholarly work, while the institution’s (agent) desire is to expend more time 
on research. 
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Informational asymmetries and goal conflicts can be considered “the spark plugs” 
of agency theory (Waterman & Meier, 1998).  These two components together create 
agency problems.  If there were no goal conflicts, the existence of informational 
asymmetries would not matter and the agent would automatically choose the actions 
desired by the principal.  The assumption and existence of goal conflict is necessary for 
agency theory (Davis, 1997).  Similarly if the same information were equally and readily 
available to principals and agents, there would be no conflict of interest or information 
asymmetries (Ricketts, 2002).  
Differences between the Principal Agent Theory Economic and Political lens  
Political science and economics portray the Principal Agency Theory oversight 
mechanisms in different ways.  The Political Science position is that governments 
employ a range of oversight tools to ensure that the bureaucratic agents pursue legislated 
goals. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) suggested that government oversight can be 
divided between “police patrols” and “fire alarms.” Police patrols are centralized, direct 
oversights and tend to be in operation regardless of whether an agent is believed to be 
shirking or not. In higher education, police patrols include annual reports, budget reports, 
purchase approvals, audits, and other forms of required reporting (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). 
A fire alarm is “… less centralized and involves less active and direct intervention than 
police-patrol oversight; [a legislature] establishes a system of rules, procedures, and 
informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to 
examine administrative decisions (sometimes in progress), to charge executive agencies 
with violating [legislative] goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and [the 
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legislature] itself” (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984, p.166). In essence, these fire alarms 
depend on non-governmental actors to oversee the activities of bureaucratic agents and 
sound an alarm when shirking is believed to be taking place. 
Lane (2008) found state governments to monitor institutional behavior through 
different mechanisms of oversight that, in addition to typical direct mechanisms (e.g., 
purchase approvals, program reviews, budget reviews, etc.), also include such indirect 
mechanisms as investigative reports by the press, communiqué from constituents, and 
legislative hearings where individuals can raise issues about an institution’s activities.  
In the field of economics, the essence of Principal Agent Theory oversight 
focuses more on the type of behavior to be overseen rather than the mechanisms used to 
oversee the behavior. Economists make a distinction between “behavior-based contracts” 
and “out- come-based contracts” (Eisenhardt, 1989).  When entering into a behavior-
based contract the principal chooses to monitor agent’s behaviors and then reward those 
behaviors. As the name implies, outcome-based contracts compensate agents for 
achieving desired outcomes. Outcome-based contracts are considered to be effective in 
curbing the possibility of an agent acting in an opportunistic way (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Bergen, 1992). 
No matter how it is designed, oversight is the “lynch pin” of the PAT relationship; 
for without it the agent has little incentive to pursue the principal’s desires and the 
principal has no means to ensure that its goals are being pursued by the agent (Lane & 
Kivisto, 2008). 
Solutions to principal-agent relationship problems 
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If principal-agent relationship problems start at the contractual level, then 
solutions must lie in reviewing and adjusting the contract. In evaluating writings from 
this perspective, one must ask whether adequate emphasis has been given to non-
economic considerations: cultural, social, psychological, and political. Wood and 
Waterman (1994) noted that responsiveness of the bureaucrat to political controls is the 
norm, not the exception, even though political controls are not part of the employee 
contract.  
Petersen (1995) suggests there are several basic elements in all principal-agent 
relationships which affect the choice of the solution to the problem. Agents differ by 
types of values, attitudes, level of risk aversion, and abilities. An agent’s actions bring 
about an outcome or a product.  The amount of effort and diligence applied by an agent 
determines the output, but that application is costly and may not be in the agent’s self-
interest. Another element is the existence of random factors in the environment that are 
outside the control of both principal and agent.  Random factors affect the degree to 
which the outcome meets the principal’s and agent’s objectives.  Examples of random 
factors would be competitors’ prices in retail business, the amount of water used in the 
growing of crops, the level of ability and motivation of students in education, or 
mandated budget cuts instituted by state legislation.  These outcomes may be either a 
single or multifaceted product, or a tangible or intangible product, such as a service.  
When quality is a crucial characteristic of the output, measurement becomes problematic.  
Studies in Higher Education Using Principal Agent Theory 
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The Principal-Agent framework was initially applied to the private sector, but 
there is a continuing growth of literature regarding its application to public enterprises, 
including higher education. Managers of public enterprises may be motivated by the 
‘power and perks’ that come from expansion at the expense of efficiency (Auld, 2010). 
Such enterprises are often ‘owned’ by government where the goal of the principal is re-
election. The principals, in this case one or more levels of government, expect 
universities and colleges, as the agents, to carry out their social and economic agendas, 
which may coincide with the objectives of higher education (Auld, 2010).  
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) conducted a study on the determinants of faculty 
pay at universities using agency theory to test 12 hypotheses.  The study included a 
sample of 1,100 management professors drawn from a list from the Academy of 
Management, with 60% of the participants from doctoral granting institutions and 40% 
from non-doctoral granting institutions.  The study’s final analysis included 353 
participants. Descriptive statistics and a qualitative analysis of a social science citation 
index were used to analyze the number of citations in top tier journals of the participants 
followed by a hierarchical multiple regression analysis of all 12 hypotheses. The study 
presented a classical principal-agent theory relationship, that university administrators 
(principals) face issues with faculty (agents) when determining faculty pay.  Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin noted that informational asymmetries exist between university 
administrators and faculty. This creates an environment for high agency cost in order to 
monitor the faculty’s behavior or work.  Gomez-Mejia and Balkin found that the 
outcomes of agent performance (top-tier articles) that most closely aligned the interests of 
principals and agents were found to have the greatest impact on faculty salary (Kivisto, 
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2007).  Gomez-Mejia and Balkin stated that the applicability of agency theory can be 
very useful to analyze internal control relationships between allocators (principals) and 
those receiving allocations (agents).  They also suggested that agency theory is useful as 
an explanatory framework for examining and monitoring issues or agency problems 
internal to organizations. 
McLendon (2003) examined different models and approaches to further develop 
the study of the politics of higher education.  McLendon discusses the application of 
principal-agent theory in studying the politics of higher education and proposes that 
further studies using principal-agent theory provide a useful conceptual lens to examine 
factors affecting political control of the state higher education bureaucracy. McLendon 
points outs that most higher education political studies examined the relationship between 
state executives and/or legislators (principals) and state higher education boards (agents) 
and recommends that additional studies shift the level of analysis down to the board 
(principal) – university (agent) relationship where he first mentions the existence of 
multiple principals.  “For example, in many states, public colleges and universities may 
be viewed as agents with more than one principal (e.g., governors, legislatures, state 
boards). McLendon (2003) poses the question, “When faced with commands from 
multiple or even competing principals, which principal do universities follow? (p.173)”. 
Moe (1987) argued that when multiple principals exist, “agents will be attracted to 
strategies that play its principals off against one another” (p. 482).  
Additional research in higher education has focused primarily on the role that the 
college or university board plays as the agent to the government (Toma, 1986, 1990; 
Lowry, 2001; Liefner 2003; Kivisto, 2008). Toma (1986) first posed the question: “why 
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would politicians select one type of governing structure over another to exercise their role 
as the principal?” (p.156) His study included a quantitative analysis of data from 1970 
from 47 states using least square regression.   The data included six variables: the total 
number of universities in a state divided by the number of boards governing these 
institutions, the total population of the state, the size of total private endowment of the 
state’s public institutions, proportion of institutions in the state which are private, per 
capita income of the state, and the number of representatives per capita in the state’s 
legislature. His analysis found a positive relationship between the number of universities 
governed by a board in a state and its population size. The greater the population of the 
state, the greater number of universities under a single board or principal. Toma’s 
findings suggest that external factors such as the state population size also influence the 
internal structure of an organization. 
In both the U.S. public universities and colleges and higher education institutions 
in Europe where the board composition includes a significant number of political 
appointments, Toma’s question is critical. Research on this question has led some 
scholars to conclude that the centralization of governance leads to lower costs for 
students (Lowry, 2001). Toma’s inquiry demonstrates the utility of using PAT to study 
higher education governance. Other studies imply that the role of agent can be transferred 
to the president, dean or department chair, but this is not explored formally (Liefner, 
2003). None of these studies focus on the roles between a single institution and a system 
office in the funding process. 
Liefner (2003) argues in favor of contracts that specify performance based 
funding. His study included four institutions: two in the United States, one in Switzerland 
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and one in Germany.  He carried out 117 in-depth interviews with administrators and 
professors between July 1998 and October 1999 and developed case studies for each 
institution. His empirical work concluded that at many universities, long-term success is 
based on the qualifications and abilities of the people employed by the institution, 
independent of the method of resource allocation by the principal.  
 He noted that performance-based funding brings about positive changes and it is 
also a cause of unintended side effects.  Academics and managers were influenced by the 
forms of resource allocation, particularly in their level of activities, the kinds of activities 
they engaged in and their methods of dealing with risk. Performance-based funding led to 
higher activity among less-productive or less-motivated scholars.  The qualified and 
motivated faculty would not change their behavior and avoided projects that might be 
professionally risky. Liefner recommends that performance-based methods of budgeting 
ensure that resources are reallocated to units and individuals who have been successful in 
the past or demonstrate excellent promise for the future.  
Liefner’s (2003) findings supports Toma’s (1990) premise that any theory of 
higher education governance cannot merely account for the existence of principals, but 
rather must also account for the composition of those principals (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).   
 Gornitzka (2004) examined changes and requirements of contractual 
arrangements for non-academic staff at three Norwegian universities over a period from 
1987 to 1999.   The data included non-academic staff salary statistics, years of 
employment, formal education level, gender, and age.  She found that non-academic staff 
in general are not “comfortable” with their roles continuously being negotiated and 
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defined. She further noted that paying attention only to administrative cost and 
efficiencies might inhibit an understanding of non-academic personnel’s contributions 
and role in the university.  She concluded that a more finely tuned integration of the 
quality evaluation system with additional regulations reduces information asymmetries 
between institutional administration (principal) and non-academic staff (agent) and 
improves efficiency. 
The studies outlined above are an important body of literature for this research in 
that they provide some foundation for examining the funding relationship between a 
system office (principal) and an institution (agent) and what commands, controls and 
expectations would be the outcomes of said relationship under a principal-agent 
conceptual lens. 
Summary 
The research presented in this chapter makes apparent the need to study funding 
processes at a system-institutional level due to the lack of studies of this nature. This 
chapter provided an overview of the available funding mechanisms and sources to higher 
education, the decline of state funding and the competition for funding resources that 
higher education experiences with other state agencies.  The overall decline of federal 
funding and the impact it has had on higher education provides a sense of the current 
landscape upon which institutions are currently operating. Additionally, since this study 
focuses on a single institution in California, a brief fiscal history and leadership context is 
provided to situate the study. 
55 
The final section reviewed literature on the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT). 
Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) offers an appropriate framework for investigating the 
interactions between a single public institution of higher education (agent) and the system 
office (principal) it reports to through the transactions between administrators as 
representatives of the organizational culture.  The added value of PAT is its capacity to 
analyze the relationship between actors of higher education based on observable, 
measurable, tangible mechanisms that the actors utilize in controlling, resisting, and 
allying with other actors.  The theory serves as the theoretical framework for this 
research.   
The next chapter details the methodological plan for executing the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This study employs a qualitative research approach.  An exploratory single case 
study design is used as a method of inquiry.  This single case study examines the funding 
allocation processes between one public institution of higher education and the system 
office to which it reports.  The unit of analysis is the contract and/or agreement 
specifying how funding allocations take place and the expectations connected to such 
allocations between the two organizations: The CSU System Office and the CSU 
Campus. The case is bounded by the funding allocation processes between the institution 
and the system office.  Principal Agent Theory is selected in order to construct a rigorous 
case study and to define the unit of analysis and conceptual framework (Yin, 1981).  
According to Longberg & Phillips (1996), qualitative research is particularly 
valuable when there is limited knowledge about a specific population or topic under 
consideration.  While research on state funding exists and has received much attention 
over the years (Layzell, 2003; McLendon, 2003; Hossler, 2004; Institute for Higher 
Education Leadership and Policy [IHELP], 2011), research studies examining funding 
issues below the state level are sorely lacking.  Therefore, a qualitative research approach 
is appropriate for this study since very little knowledge exists about this subject. 
This chapter provides the theoretical and practical foundation for the qualitative 
data collection techniques utilized in the study.  The following aspects of the study are 
explained in this chapter: the research design; participant selection; data collection 
procedures, data analysis and ethical considerations. 
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Research Design 
 A case study is an in depth and detailed examination of one setting, a single 
subject, an interaction or a depository of documents (Merriam 1988; Yin 1989; Stake, 
1994; Biklen & Bogdan, 2006). Creswell (2007) states that case study research involves 
the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system (e.g. a 
place, a context). This methodology is selected for this study because the phenomenon 
under consideration is a complex interaction between two organizations.  Creswell (2007) 
also states that a case study is a good approach when the inquirer has a clearly 
identifiable case with boundaries and seeks to provide an in depth understanding of it. 
The identified single case is the examination of the relationship between two 
organizations bounded by the funding interactions between the two.  
Since one of the aims of this study is to initiate research about the relationship 
between an institution and the system office to which it reports, an exploratory case study 
is an appropriate approach.  Exploratory case studies aim to define the questions and 
hypotheses of subsequent research or determine the feasibility of the desired research 
procedures (Yin, 2003).  Exploratory case studies are a prelude to social research, not just 
to other case studies (Yin, 1991, 2003). 
In case study research, the role of theory is to assist in the design of research steps 
according to some relationship to the literature, policy issues, or substantive source (Yin, 
1981a, 1981b).  The role of theory in case studies assists in selecting the cases to be 
studied, to delimit a case study inquiry to its most effective design and to attempt to 
generalize subsequent results. For this study, Principal Agent Theory (PAT) is selected to 
provide the conceptual framework and define the unit of analysis.   
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Research Questions 
The research questions for this study are:  
1. What expectations does the System office have of the institutions to which it 
allocates funds? 
2. Does an institution perceive that the System Office has attached expectations to 
the funds that it allocates to the institutions? 
3. What insights does Principal Agent Theory provide about the relationship 
between the System Office and institutions with respect to funding allocation as it 
flows from the System Office to the institution? 
a. From the principal (System Office) and agent (institution) perspective, 
does a contract with respect to funding exist between the two 
organizations? 
b. From the principal (System Office) perspective, are the agents 
(institutions) fulfilling their contracts?  
c. From the agent’s (institutions’) perspective, are they fulfilling their 
contractual duty? 
Site Selection 
In qualitative research, site selections are usually small samples and studied 
intensively. This small sample of site selections typically generates a large amount of 
information.  The method of site selection is not based on theories of the statistical 
probability of selection, but on other purposeful or theoretical sampling criteria 
(Maxwell, 1996, 2005).  Selecting a site in which to conduct the study is deliberate with 
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emphasis on places thought likely to yield rich material pertinent to the inquiry.  An 
additional point of consideration for qualitative researchers is the degree of participants’ 
accessibility and sites; reaching less accessible participants and sites usually increases the 
cost and time of conducting the study (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996).  
For this study, the first criterion for selecting a site was to consider states located 
within driving distance to the researcher to minimize travel time and cost.  States which 
met this criteria included Arizona, California, Nevada and Utah. 
The second criterion was to select a public institution regulated by an established 
System Office or Chancellor’s office. Today, most public institutions governed by a 
System Office belong to a multi-campus system which as a model has come to dominate 
public higher education (Johnstone, 1993). Public multi-campus systems, for the purpose 
of this study, are defined as groups of public institutions, each with its own mission, 
academic programs, internal governing policies and procedures.  These systems also 
include a system-wide chief executive officer, generally called the “Chancellor.”  The 
system will: have a board of regents or directors to set system policies; allocate public 
resources among the constituent institutions within whatever latitude is allowed by the 
state; establish, reaffirm, or alter the missions and programs of the constituent institutions 
(Johnstone, 1993). 
Multi-campus systems exist in all four of the states identified by the researcher as 
accessible.  However, the researcher developed a relationship with a gatekeeper at the 
California State University Campus through a class assignment and most recently, 
through membership in the Western Association of Colleges and Universities Business 
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Officers (WACUBO). The researcher has also established initial relationships with 
California State University (CSU) System Office staff, making both organizations more 
accessible. 
Additionally, the selection of the California State University was made based on 
the size of the system, which serves twenty-three state universities, and its history as one 
of the oldest multi-campus systems in the nation. California’s long history of fluctuating 
higher education funding presents a unique opportunity to explore the complexities of 
funding issues facing institutions and systems. 
  With the inception of the California Master Plan for Higher Education in 1960, 
California became the first state to develop a coherent public higher education system. It 
established a tripartite structure consisting of the nation’s first network of public 
community colleges, a set of regional teachers’ state colleges and the nation’s first multi-
campus state university and the University of California (UC) (Richardson, 1997; 
Douglass, 2002). Today, this tripartite system includes the California Community 
Colleges, the California State University and the University of California. 
The California State University (CSU) also was selected as the study’s focus due 
to its rich 50 year history and its reputation as the first multi-campus system of 
institutions in the United States. The California State University (CSU) is comprised of 
23 campuses. The individual California State Colleges were brought together as a system 
by the Donahoe Higher Education Act of 1960. In 1972, the system became the 
California State University and Colleges, and in 1982, the system became The California 
State University. Today the campuses of the CSU include comprehensive and polytechnic 
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universities, and since July 1995 also include the California Maritime Academy, a 
specialized campus. The CSU has approximately 433,000 students and 44,000 faculty 
and staff (www.calstate.edu, 2011). 
Furthermore, a single institution from the CSU system was selected to be part of 
the case study. The institution selected for purposes of this study is called the California 
State University Campus, considered to be a small-medium size campus within the CSU 
system. The CSU Campus is a comprehensive, urban public university with the Carnegie 
classification (2010) of a Masters I institution awarding degrees through the Masters and 
Specialist level. The Legislature of the State of California authorized the establishment of 
CSU - Campus in 1960 and the first students were enrolled in the fall of 1965. It is 
designated as a Hispanic Serving Institution (www.CSUDH.edu, 2010). 
Participant Selection 
For this study, the purposeful sampling technique and negotiating research 
relationship practices were used to select participants.  Purposeful sampling in qualitative 
research "is a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or activities are selected 
deliberately in order to provide information that can't be obtained as well from other 
choices” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 88). Creswell (2002) describes four goals for purposeful 
sampling: 1) Achieve representativeness of the context, which includes the setting, the 
individuals, and the activities, 2) adequately capture the heterogeneity in the population 
3) deliberately examine cases that are critical for the theories that you began the study 
with, or that you have subsequently developed and 4) establish particular comparisons to 
illuminate the reasons for differences between settings or individuals. The purposefully 
selected individuals cannot provide all views in their respective organizations.  This is an 
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area of qualitative research in which researchers rely on a small number of informants for 
a major portion of their data, and though these informants are purposefully selected and 
the data itself seems valid, there is no guarantee that these informants' views are typical 
(Maxwell, 2005). 
The practice of negotiating research relationships is the concept of understanding 
or knowing who the gatekeepers are at the sites selected for the research.  Gatekeepers 
are other individuals who are not necessarily participants but who control access 
(Maxwell, 2005). They can either help or hinder the process.  As an example, for this 
study the administrative assistant to the Vice President of Finance and Administration 
(VPFA) was a gatekeeper at the institution since the researcher scheduled, re-scheduled 
and coordinated interview appointments with this individual.   
Research relationships require an ongoing process of negotiation so that trust, 
intimacy, and reciprocity can be developed.  Relationships are neither static nor simple 
and "what you need are relationships that allow you to ethically gain the information that 
can answer your research questions” (Maxwell, 2005; p. 83). 
The participants purposefully sought are finance administrators and system staff 
associated directly and indirectly with the funding process.  In the case of the institution, 
the Vice President for Finance and Administration (VPFA) was sought in order to 
understand the institution’s experiences in dealing with the system office.  It was 
important to identify with whom the institution interacts at the system office so as to gain 
an understanding of how funding takes place between the two organizations from the 
point of view of the institution.  Also needed is an understanding of how system office 
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expectations are communicated to the institution, how the institution carries out such 
expectations, and an historical perspective of the institution-system relationship.  The 
Assistant VPFA who has less exposure with the institution-system relationship, but rather 
more experience as a content or functional expert, was sought.  This individual provided 
a different perspective of the nature and timing of funding related report requests, 
documents and presentation preparations, and some of the reporting expectations of the 
system office.  
In terms of the System Office, staff associated with the funding processes was 
queried and, the Chancellor was contacted. Access to the Chancellor was not gained due 
to his transition commitments prior to retirement; instead the study relied on other 
administrators who support and work with the Chancellor to obtain an understanding of 
how the System Office’s expectations are communicated to the institutions. How are 
expectations communicated to the institutions and how often? Who at the system office 
interacts with the institutions? Table 3 provides a summary of the original target 
participants selected by site and recruitment method. Appendixes C, D, and E also 
provides organizational charts for the System Office Leadership and the institution 
Finance and Administration division for reference purposes. 
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Table 3 
Site Selection, Participants and Participants’ Recruitment  
Site Participants Method & Purpose for Recruitment 
Institution *Vice President of 
Finance and 
Administration 
(VPFA) 
Purposeful Sampling Technique  
to understand the institutional experiences dealing with the 
system office,  
to identify who at the system office the institution interacts 
with, 
to gain an understanding of how funding takes place between 
the two organizations from the point of view of the institution, 
to understand how system office expectations are 
communicated to the institution, and 
how the institution carries out such expectations, 
to obtain a historical perspective of the institution-system 
relationship. 
Institution President to understand the institutional experiences dealing with the 
system office,  
to identify who at the system office the institution interacts 
with, 
to gain an understanding of how funding takes place between 
the two organizations from the point of view of the institution, 
to understand how system office expectations are 
communicated to the institution, and 
how the institution carries out such expectations, 
to obtain a historical perspective of the institution-system 
relationship. 
Institution *Assistant Vice 
President of finance 
and Administration 
(AVPFA) 
Nature and timing of funding related report requests, 
document and presentation preparations, and some of the 
reporting expectations of the system office. 
System office Chancellor To obtain an understanding of how the system office’s 
expectations are communicated to the institutions. How are 
changes in expectations communicated to the institutions and 
how often?  
System office *Vice Chancellor for 
Budget  
Purposeful Sampling Technique  
To obtain an understanding of how the system office’s 
expectations are communicated to the institutions. How are 
changes in expectations communicated to the institutions and 
how often? Who at the system office interacts with the 
institutions? 
System office *Assistant Vice 
Chancellor for 
Financial Services 
Purposeful Sampling Technique  
To obtain an understanding of how the system office’s 
expectations communicated to the institutions. How are 
changes in expectations communicated to the institutions and 
how often? Who at the system office interacts with the 
institutions? 
 
Note: Administrators with an asterisk (*) denotes those who were interviewed as part of 
this study. 
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Data Collection Procedures 
This study employs in depth interviews and document review strategies in an 
effort to understand the experiences of finance administrators and system office officials.   
In Depth Interviews 
Interviews provide very different data from observations: they allow the 
researcher to capture the perspectives of participants. The use of interviews as a data 
collection method begins with the assumption that the participants’ perspectives are 
meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit. An interview, rather than a paper 
and pencil survey, is selected when interpersonal contact is important and when 
opportunities for follow up on interesting comments are desired (Seidman, 2006). 
Two types of interviews are used in qualitative research: structured interviews, in 
which a carefully worded questionnaire is administered; and unstructured interviews, in 
which the interviewer does not follow a rigid form (Putney, 2002). In structured 
interviews, there is an emphasis on obtaining answers to carefully phrased questions. 
Unstructured interviews, however, enable the interviewer to encourage free and open 
responses, though there may be a tradeoff between comprehensive coverage of topics and 
in depth exploration of a more limited set of questions. Unstructured interviews are also 
called “in depth interviews,” as the goal is an understanding of the lived experiences of 
other people and the meaning they make of those experiences (Seidman, 2006).  
In depth interviews are characterized by extensive probing and open-ended 
questions. Typically, the researcher prepares an interview guide that includes a list of 
questions or issues that are to be explored and suggested probes for following up on key 
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topics. The guide helps the interviewer pace the interview and makes interviewing more 
systematic and comprehensive. Such interviews are best conducted face to face, although 
in some situations telephone interviewing can be successful (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). 
Patton (1990) states specific circumstances for which in depth interviews are particularly 
appropriate, including complex subject matter, busy, high-status respondents, and highly 
sensitive subject matter. The two interview protocols for this research are included in 
Appendices A and B.  Appendix A is the draft interview guide for the institution; 
Appendix B the draft interview guide for the system office. 
Documents Review 
Existing records often provide insight into a setting and/or group of people that 
cannot be observed or noted in another way. This information can be found in document 
form. Lincoln and Guba (1985) defined a document as "any written or recorded material" 
not prepared at the request of the inquirer. Documents can be divided into two major 
categories: public records and personal documents (Guba & Lincoln, 1981).  
Public records are materials created and kept for the purpose of "attesting to an 
event or providing an accounting" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Public records can be 
collected externally, from outside, or internally, from within the setting in which the 
study is taking place. Examples of external records are newspaper archives, census data, 
county office records and local business records – all of which can assist the researcher in 
gathering information about relevant key areas of the study. Materials listed in table 4 
were helpful in better understanding the participants and developing the case study. 
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Examples of internal records include documents such as internal memoranda, 
annual reports, budgets, minutes of meetings, policy manuals, institutional histories, 
official correspondence, demographic material, and mass media reports and 
presentations. They are particularly useful in describing institutional and/or system 
characteristics. Documents can help the researcher understand the institution and system 
office resources, values, processes, priorities and concerns. Furthermore, they provide a 
record or history not subject to recall bias. 
Personal documents are first-person accounts of events and experiences. These 
"documents of life" include diaries, portfolios, photographs, artwork, schedules, 
scrapbooks, poetry, and letters to the paper. Personal documents can help the researcher 
understand how the participant sees the world and what she or he wants to communicate 
to an audience (Fetterman, 1989). For this study, participants may keep personal notes or 
memos about particulars of the process or notes attached to board meeting schedules 
referring to the nature of a meeting or audience. 
Table 4 
Data Sources Definitions and Types 
 Data source Interviewees Documents 
Definition Interviewing is a basic mode of inquiry and the 
primary way a researcher can investigate an 
organization or process is through the 
experience of the individual people (Seidman, 
2006; pg. 10) 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) defined a 
document as "any written or recorded 
material" not prepared at the request 
of the inquirer. 
Who/What VPFA 
AVPFA 
Special Assistant to VPFA 
President 
System staff associated with funding process 
Chancellor 
internal memoranda 
annual reports 
institutional budgets 
system budgets 
state budgets 
minutes of meetings 
policy manuals institutional histories 
official correspondence, material mass 
media reports and presentations 
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Access 
Participants were contacted via email or phone to secure initial participation 
support and to provide a brief description of the study.  Subsequently, an email followed 
as a reminder to each participant who scheduled an interview, including the time and 
date, projected length of the interview and purpose of the study.   
Additionally, contact information for the researcher and the Institutional Research 
Board at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas was provided to address any concerns that 
the participants have had prior to and throughout the interview process and the overall 
study. In accordance with the institution's policy, all study records were kept in a locked 
cabinet at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  
The researcher scheduled interviews over the telephone with finance 
administrators at the two organizations: California State University, Campus (institution) 
and the California State University system office, personally collecting data from two 
main sources.  The sources of information included interviews and documents in order to 
provide a broad range of data with which to address the research questions (Creswell, 
1994; Yin, 1994). The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
Data Analysis 
In this study, content analysis was utilized as a method of analyzing the data. The 
origins of content analysis as a data analysis method have been traced to the year 1640 in 
Sweden where it was used to compare content in religious hymns (Krippendorff, 2004b). 
One of the earliest definitions was provided by Holsti (1969): “Content analysis is any 
technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
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characteristics of messages” (p. 14). Weber (1985) defines content analysis as “a research 
methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (p. 9). 
Patton (2002) refers to content analysis as quantitative data reduction that attempts to 
make sense of qualitative material. This includes finding core meanings through patterns 
and tabulating responses (Patton, 2002; Gall, 2003). Analysis is the phase that allows 
interpretation to be possible (LeCompte, 2000). Krippendorff (2004b) defined content 
analysis as "a research technique for making reliable and valid inferences from data to 
their context'' (p. 18). 
Content analysis is typically performed on forms of human communication 
including books, newspapers, films, television, music, and transcripts of conversations 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2001).  Babbie (1999) claims that "content analysis methods may be 
applied to virtually any form of communication" (p. 286). As long as other pertinent 
characteristics are present (i.e., counting of key categories, summarizing of message), 
content analysis can be used to study any message, either mediated (recorded 
conversation) or non-mediated (face to face) (Neuendorf, 2002). 
Content analysis is a systematic procedure for the quantification and objective 
examination of qualitative data by the classification and evaluation of terms, themes, or 
ideas. For example, the measurement of frequency, order, or intensity of occurrence of 
the words, phrases, or sentences in a communication in order to determine their meaning 
or effect. Babbie (2007) defines content analysis as "the study of recorded human 
communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws." To conduct a content 
analysis on any such text, the text is coded or broken down into manageable preset and/or 
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emergent codes and then categories on a variety of levels--word, word sense, phrase, 
sentence, or theme, then categorical associations developed, if any exist.   
According to Altheide (1996), a major difference between quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis is that qualitative content analysis relies on “the reflexive and 
highly interactive nature of the investigator, concepts, data collection, and analysis” (p. 
16). 
Sarantakos (2005) introduces a comprehensive list of the main features of content 
analysis, as follows: 
 Is a documentary method that includes written material, official documents, 
speeches, photographs, interview transcriptions and so on 
 Is the study of the content of texts, such as words, meanings and pictures 
 Is quantitative, in that it measures objectively specific attributes of text contents 
 Is qualitative, in that it focuses on meanings and interpretations in text 
 Is non-reactive, in that the document was not produced with the knowledge that it 
 would be subjected to this analysis 
 Is transparent, in that its procedure is clear and open and that it can be replicated 
 Is unobtrusive, in that it studies the document without the knowledge of the author 
 Is a diverse and flexible method that can be applied in a variety of contexts and 
 materials 
 Is longitudinal, in that it can address the same issue over a period of time 
 Is comparative, in that it can produce cross-sectional and cross-cultural data 
(p.299) 
Content analysis has many strengths as well as weaknesses, which are important 
to reference in selecting this research method. Table 5 summarizes these strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
  
71 
Table 5 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Content Analysis [Source: Sarantakos, S.(2005), Social 
research pp307-308)] 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Content analysis is unobtrusive and therefore has 
no effects on the respondent. 
 Content analysis can be used when access to the 
research topic or research units is not possible. 
In some cases the research topic might not be 
currently accessible and cannot be approached 
through other methods. Content analysis is the 
only way of data generation. 
 Content analysis does not require respondents, 
and so avoids the various problems often 
associated with them. 
 The fact that content analysis involves already 
completed material and no respondents 
eliminates researcher bias. 
 Accessibility of the research material is a 
significant advantage. Texts are readily available 
for testing and re-testing. This is not possible 
when the human factor is involved in research. 
 Content analysis is a low-cost method compared 
with other methods, such as surveys. 
 Content analysis entails less bias than other 
methods, given that text offers information in a 
neutral form, ready to be researched by the 
investigator. 
 Some documents may not be 
accessible to the researcher; personal 
letters and diaries, for instance, might 
be difficult to obtain. 
 Documents often contain information 
related to a small proportion of 
people, and are therefore not 
representative. 
 Content analysis cannot study 
unrecorded events: it is therefore 
restricted to what has been 
documented. 
 Documents often are not complete; 
the information may therefore be 
biased and often unreliable. 
 Content analysis is less suitable for 
making comparisons than other 
methods 
 Content analysis is susceptible to 
coder bias. 
 
As shown in Table 5, the major advantages of content analysis are 
unobtrusiveness, accessibility, and cost-effectiveness.  
Development of Preset Codes 
Content analysis relies on coding of data classified in a conceptual framework 
driven by the objectives of the research questions and the study’s theoretical framework. 
The coding process records the presence or absence of predetermined and defined 
attributes (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001; Neuendorf, 2002), called preset codes, and the 
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development of categories that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. There are multiple 
steps to code development including: identifying, categorizing, classifying and labeling 
the patterns that evolve (Patton, 2002). 
The researcher developed an initial list of preset codes, shown in Appendix K, to 
use as a guide during data analysis. These preset codes will provide direction for data 
analysis.  According to Miles and Huberman (1994), preset codes are efficient data 
labeling and data retrieving devices. Developing a coding system to organize data is a 
means of sorting descriptive data so that the material can be physically separated. 
Content analysis appraises manifest content, referred to by Babbie (1999) as that 
which is visible on the surface. But more recently, content analysis has been applied to 
latent content, which cannot be measured directly (Neuendorf, 2002) but can be measured 
by one or more indicators.  Emergent codes were developed for latent meaning that 
evolved from the analysis of interview transcription (Berg, 2007). 
Emergent Data Codes 
Emergent codes are usually not preset in advance; however these codes emerge 
after reading through the text.  These may be ideas or concepts not considered through 
the review of literature or theory, but rather surface from the data collected. The two 
approaches of preset and emergent codes may be combined as new ideas and concepts 
form to allow for the inclusion of new concepts (Biklen & Bodgan, 2007).  
Category construction 
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According to Sarantakos (2005), “A category is a set of criteria that are integrated 
around a theme or value” (p. 302). Berelson (1952) put emphasis on the importance of 
categorization in content analysis: Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. 
Particular studies have been productive when categories were clearly formulated and well 
adapted to the content. A content analysis can be no better than its system of categories. 
Holsti (as cited in Merriam, 1988) concurred with Berelson (1952) and further suggests 
some general principles of category construction: 
 The categories should reflect the purpose of the research. Care should be 
taken to ensure that categories are congruent with research goals and 
questions. 
 The categories should be exhaustive – that is, all relevant items in the sample 
of documents under study must be capable of being placed in a category 
 The categories should be mutually exclusive – no single unit of material 
should be placed in more than one category. 
 The categories should be independent in that the assignment of any datum into 
a category will not affect the classification of other data. 
 All categories should derive from a single classification principle. (p. 136). 
Following Holsti’s principles, the researcher established category systems in two 
ways: standard categories and theoretical categories. Berg (2007) points out that, “The 
theoretical categories are those that emerge in the course of analyzing the data and 
provide an overarching pattern that occurs throughout the analysis” (p. 316). Thus, a 
qualitative and inductive approach was adopted for theoretical category construction. 
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Category constructions starts with standard categories and open coding. Open 
coding is the central purpose which was “to open inquiry widely” (Berg, 2007, p. 317). 
Open coding allowed new themes and concepts to be detected with analysis. The 
researcher constantly compared those themes with other emerging themes so as to 
“undergo continuous refinement through the data collection and analysis process and 
continuously feedback into the process of category coding” (Goetz & LeCompte, 1984, p. 
182). 
ATLAS.ti was utilized to aid in the organization, coding, and categorizing of the 
data (Creswell, 2007). During the proposal phase of this study, the researcher decided to 
use ATLAS.ti because qualitative computer programs are useful in helping researchers 
analyze data more closely and efficiently (Creswell, 2007). The in-depth interviews were 
transcribed and the transcriptions documents were uploaded to ATLAS.ti. Once the 
documents were uploaded and coded, ATLAS.ti was used to provide network views of 
relationships between themes found in each of the interviews. 
Validity and Trustworthiness 
Patton (2002) states that validity and reliability are two factors that any qualitative 
researcher should be concerned about while designing a study, analyzing results, and 
judging the quality of the study. 
Validity 
The traditional criteria for validity find their roots in a positivist tradition, and to 
an extent, positivism has been defined by a systematic theory of validity. Within the 
positivist terminology, validity resided amongst and was the result and culmination of 
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other empirical conceptions: universal laws, evidence, objectivity, truth, actuality, 
deduction, reason, fact and mathematical data, to name just a few (Winter, 2000). 
In qualitative research, validating findings, "means that the researcher determines 
the accuracy or credibility of the findings through strategies such as member checking 
and triangulation" (Creswell, 2005, p. 600). Triangulation may include multiple methods 
of data collection and data analysis, but does not suggest a fix method for all research. 
The methods chosen in triangulation to test the validity and reliability of a study depend 
on the criterion of the research. Patton (2002) advocates the use of triangulation by 
stating triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods.   
The researcher triangulated the results by allowing participants to review the 
transcripts and findings, provide feedback, and ensure the essence of their stories were 
captured correctly. 
Trustworthiness  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that the trustworthiness of a research report 
depends on the issues, quantitatively discussed as validity and reliability. The idea of 
discovering truth through measures of reliability and validity is replaced by the idea of 
trustworthiness (Mishler, 2000), which is “defensible” (Johnson 2002, p. 282) and 
establishing confidence in the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). According to Guba 
(1985) four issues of trustworthiness demand attention: credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. Credibility is an evaluation of whether or not the 
research findings represent a “credible” conceptual interpretation of the data drawn from 
the participants’ original data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.296). Transferability is the 
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degree to which the findings of this inquiry can apply or transfer beyond the bounds of 
the project. Dependability is an assessment of the quality of the integrated processes of 
data collection, data analysis, and theory generation. Confirmability is a measure of how 
well the inquiry’s findings are supported by the data collected. (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
In this inquiry, trustworthiness was enhanced through the strategies detailed below. 
To address credibility, the researcher employed two techniques. First, in 
designing the research procedure, the researcher interviewed individuals closely involved 
with the funding process and individuals involved at the executive level as functional 
experts. The intent was to generate layers of data from each organization via several 
participants. This technique, while not meeting the technical definition of “triangulation” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985), provides a richer, multilayered and more credible data set.  
The researcher completed “Member Checking” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) with any 
of the participants willing and available to review the analysis of the transcribed 
interviews. During the process of Member Checking, each of the research participants 
reviewed a summary of the data analysis procedure and a summary of the final results of 
the inquiry. The participants were asked to offer comments on whether or not they felt the 
data was interpreted in a manner congruent with their own experiences.  
To address transferability, the research includes in the appendix section (appendix 
H, and appendix I), several of the data analysis documents used to generate the answer to 
the research question. The complete set of data analysis documents is on file and 
available upon request. This access to the inquiry’s “paper trail” gives other researchers 
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the ability to transfer the conclusions of this inquiry to other cases, or to repeat as closely 
as possible the procedures of this project. 
To address the issues of dependability and confirmability, the research relied on 
the review of the research methods utilized through the study by the dissertation advisor 
and dissertation committee members (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 1990). After 
completing data analysis and writing the bulk of Chapters Four and Five, the dissertation 
chair had available for examination the researcher’s audit trail consisting of the original 
transcripts, data analysis documents, field journal, comments from the member checking, 
and the text of the dissertation itself. Based on established precedent in Qualitative 
Research, the researcher assessed both the dependability and confirmability of the 
project, as well as the completeness and availability of auditable documents.  
Ethical Considerations 
Qualitative research is particularly susceptible to ethical dilemmas, especially 
research that chooses to, "enter the lives of others - especially those in vulnerable 
situations and at pivotal points of time" (Clark & Sharf, 2007, p. 399). The topic of ethics 
is emotionally charged and surrounded with suggestive and hidden meanings.  In 
research, ethics are the principles of right and wrong (Biklen & Bogdan, 2007).  In 
research with human subjects, two main issues govern traditional official guidelines of 
ethics: informed consent and the protection of informants from harm. These guidelines 
ensure that informants enter the research voluntarily with an understanding of the nature 
of the study, the dangers and obligations.  Researchers then anticipate issues of 
negotiating entry, reciprocity, role maintenance, and receptivity while also adhering to 
the ethical principles (Biklen & Bogdan, 2007; Marshall& Rossman, 2006). 
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Prior to collecting data and in order to account for any ethical concerns, approval 
was obtained from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas (UNLV) Office for the Protection of Human Subjects who deemed this research 
exempt from a full IRB review board process. The IRB seeks to ensure that risks to the 
research participants are minimal and are either equal to or outweighed by the benefits of 
the study.  
To ensure participant protection, the informed consent letter accompanied by a 
description of the purpose of the study was provided to each participant prior to entering 
the site to ensure that the participants’ decision to proceed with the interviews is 
voluntary.  The sites selected are disclosed in this study; however, individual participants' 
anonymity was assured by assigning each participant a unique number, meaning that they 
would not be uniquely identified either in conversation or in the study (Creswell, 2005). 
The researcher holds a professional position as Special Assistant to the Vice 
President of Finance and Administration at Nevada State College in the state of Nevada 
and disclosed this information to all participants.  This disclosure provides the 
opportunity for reciprocity with the participants by exchanging ideas and practices in 
finance and administration divisions, and there is potential for professional knowledge 
sharing.  
Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the research design, participant selection, 
data collections procedures, data analysis and ethical considerations. In studying the 
phenomenon of the relationship between two organizations through their funding 
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interactions, the use of the qualitative single case study was deemed appropriate because 
of the exploratory nature of the study and the limited knowledge available on this topic of 
inquiry.  
The next chapter summarizes the study’s results and findings and provides an 
analysis of the data collected. The chapter includes a description of the overall themes 
that emerged from the study and vignettes from the participants. 
  
80 
CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
The purpose of this exploratory single case study was to examine the relationship 
between one public institution and the system office it reports to through an examination 
of the funding allocation processes and expectations between the two entities, within the 
context of principal agent theory. The Vice President for Finance and Administration and 
the Associate Vice President for Finance and Administration were interviewed from the 
single California State University institution included in this study.  Access to the 
University President was not gained since he was transitioning to his new role as Interim 
President. At the System Office Level, the Executive Vice Chancellor and Chief 
Financial Officer, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Vice Chancellor for Budget and the 
Budget Director were interviewed to collect data and obtain an understanding of the 
funding processes and its accompanying set of expectations.  Public record documents, 
policies and procedures, memorandums, legislative and budget reports were reviewed to 
seek insight into the resources, values, processes, priorities and concerns existing in the 
relationship between the two organizations.  The data collected from the interviews and 
document reviews were interpreted using event mapping (Spradley, 1980) and content 
analysis (Babbie, 2007).  
The data are organized using Atlas.ti, a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis (CAQDAS) program, using the preset codes developed in Chapter 3 to capture 
emergent codes and to systematically organize the findings into themes. 
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The chapter first presents a developed event map of the funding processes 
between the two organizations to provide an overall sense of inter-organizational 
interactions, the type of information that flows during such interactions, and any timing 
issues germane to the process.    The last section of the chapter summarizes the findings 
from all the data sources using content analysis. 
Event Map 
 The event map construction began with a comprehensive examination of 
documents gathered through a broad website search of the two organizations and data 
gathered through the interviews, which confirmed some of the events and dates defining 
the funding allocation process.  Event maps represent the ways in which an individual 
member or the coordinated activities of multiple actors structure their world in and 
through their interactions within a common activity (Putney, 2009), often over the course 
of time.   
In this case study event map, the funding related events of the two organizations 
are noted during the months the events took place. The stages of developing the event 
map included identifying the dates and the actual events that took place, determining who 
the individual and/or organizations involved in such events were and what type of 
dialogue or information emerged or was exchanged during those events.  
The initial stages of building the event map included reviewing the CSU System 
Office Budget Office website, which revealed a set of documents that are published with 
information on when and what type of data is required from the CSU Campuses to be 
submitted to the CSU System Office, when the data is due to the CSU Board of Trustees, 
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and upon Board approval, to the California Governor’s desk. The CSU System Office 
Budget Office also publishes a fiscal calendar that is distributed to all twenty-three CSU 
campuses with clear expectations for the reporting of budget proposals. Interviews with 
CSU System Office Budget Office staff confirmed the information gathered through the 
documents.   
At the institution level, minutes and memoranda from the University Budget 
Committee under the CSU Campus website were reviewed to understand the timing of 
events inside of the CSU Campus prior to interfacing with the set of required events 
mandated by the CSU System Office.  CSU Campus Finance and Administration 
Division administrators’ interviews data supports the event map flow with those events 
and their timing inside of the CSU Campus.   
Once the nature of the events and timing of the events internal to the two 
organizations were identified, a comprehensive event map was developed to include the 
efforts of each organization, the events in which the two organizations interact with one 
another and the events that include organizations outside of the System Office and the 
Institution as depicted on Table 7.  
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Table 6 
Case Study Chronological Event Map of the Funding Processes between the CSU System 
Office and the CSU Campus. 
Case Study Event Map 
*denotes the events with interactions between the CSU Campus and the CSU System Office. 
Dates Events 
Early Spring Campus Budget Planning Process – institutional level 
California State University (CSU) Campus University Budget Committee is charged by 
the institution’s President with addressing budget needs with campus constituents and 
preparing a campus budget proposal. 
 
April 
 
Campus Divisions Budget Justifications – institutional level 
CSU Campus divisions (Academic Affairs, Student Affairs, Business and Finance, 
Advancement, etc…) testify to the University Budget Committee regarding the needs and 
priorities for each division. 
 
May Completion of Campus Budget Process – institutional level 
CSU Campus University Budget Committee reviews division proposals, develops a set of 
propose recommendations and submits a final recommendation to the University 
President. 
 
June - mid September *Information Exchange Stage  
CSU Campus Presidents, CSU System Office Administration, Faculty Senates, California 
State Student Alliance, Alumni and community constituents engage in discussions to 
create a list of priorities for the subsequent CSU fiscal year.  
 
November *CSU Budget Plan Approval  
List of priorities is submitted to the CSU Board of Trustees for approval to become the 
Budget Plan for the entire CSU system for the next fiscal year.  The approved budget plan 
becomes the budget request to be submitted to the California Governor. 
 
November Submission of CSU Budget Request 
CSU Board of Trustees’ approved Budget Request is submitted via CSU Chancellor to 
the California Governor. 
 
December *Dissemination of Actual Budget Plan 
Based on the California Governor’s Budget Plan, the CSU Budget Office disseminates to 
the campuses via coded memos the projected allocations for each CSU campus based on 
the priorities set by the CSU Board of Trustees. 
 
November – July *CSU Campus Budget Allocations/Reductions Stage 
CSU Campuses, in constant collaboration with CSU System Office, plan their budget 
allocations or reductions based on set enrollment targets and financial obligations, and 
develop strategies to meet the expectations of the Budget Plan for the next fiscal year. 
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This event map is important in that it details the complex nature of the events and 
communications taking place among the two organizations. The map also provides an 
indication of the many layers of bureaucracy the California State University and its 
institutions operate under. There are numerous actors involved at the institution level, 
between the institution and the System Office, and between the CSU Board of Trustees 
and the California Governor’s Office. The participants’ responses support the notion of 
the complexity of interactions between the two organizations and organizations external 
to the CSU System Office and the CSU Campus.   
The development of the event map reveals four major events during which the 
two organizations in this study interact with each other: Information Exchange Stage, 
CSU Budget Plan Approval, Dissemination of Actual Budget Plan, and the CSU Campus 
Budget Allocations/Reductions Stage.  In reviewing the information that the 
organization’s exchanged in these four steps through a document review and the 
interview content analysis; these four events share three common themes: individuals 
who lack an understanding of the funding process and its expectations regardless of 
efforts to include all constituents through committees and communications; the current 
economic downturn burdens the funding process as events are in a constant state of flux; 
and the CSU benefits from the efforts and support of a healthy bureaucratic system. 
Constituents Lack of Understanding 
 There appears to be agreement that the complexity of events inside each 
organization and within the two organizations is significant in that each group spends 
considerable time and effort disseminating communications and engaging their respective 
85 
constituencies during the funding process.  Participants shared that communications 
through various committees aim to assist in the understanding of funding processes and 
the nature of set expectations connected to funding allocations and reductions. However, 
in both organizations, there is a commonly held view that some constituents lack 
understanding of how the final decisions are made. For example: who ultimately decides 
what portion of the budget to reduce; what campuses are or will be impacted; what 
programs or services are or will be reduced; and why such programs are impacted.  
Administrators interviewed at both the System Office and the institution shared opinions 
that support the notion of some constituent’s’ lack of understanding the funding process.  
CSU, System - Administrator #5 shared this view: 
I would say it has gotten less clear in the last 3-5 years.  Some of that is 
transition from one [campus] executive to a different [campus] executive.  
Some of  that is the utter chaos that exists in terms of our funding and people 
were going along for 5, 10, 15 years understanding how the process typically 
worked and then the bottom has fallen out and it’s been nuts.  It’s how the 
state has interacted with us and so it took a year or two for campuses to adjust 
to the fact that it wasn’t the chancellor’s office jerking them around it was we 
didn’t know, we didn’t have an answer so it has been a rough five years. 
 
At both organizations, multiple actors are involved early in the funding process to 
develop an inclusive budget proposal request. At the campus level, the University Budget 
Committee seeks input from all campus divisions within the CSU Campus in order to 
recommend to the Campus President a comprehensive budget proposal as seen in the first 
two events denoted on the event map.  The University Budget Committee membership 
itself attempts to be representative of all campus constituents by including three faculty 
members, administrators from University Advancement, Enrollment Management, 
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Administration and Finance and a student representative (PM 00-03 document, CSU, 
Campus, 2009).  
The sentiment from Administrator #2 aligns with Administrator #5 in that the 
complex nature of the funding process and the communications generated as a result of 
the process do not always reach all faculty, administrators and students or are not well 
understood by all constituents.  Regardless of all the efforts to include individuals early 
on in the funding process and to disseminate information across and within organizations, 
there are still pockets of individuals and groups questioning the nature, timing and 
expectations of funding decisions. 
CSU, Campus - Administrator #2 said: 
 
I would say that [campus] administration does [understand the nature of 
funding], finance [administrators] does [also understand the nature of funding 
processes], I know the president does and I would say at the vice president 
level [there is an understanding of the funding process].  Because most of 
them [the administrator’s mentioned above] are getting that information either 
first hand from the chancellor’s office or the president, and once they start 
disseminating that down, of course it loses a little bit in the translation.  So 
once it starts going out to, say the provost is communicating to the deans, you 
know they’re not getting it firsthand.  And they’re not constantly involved [in 
funding matters] with this so because of that, again, it just loses a little bit in 
the translation and some don’t understand the process. 
 
The Impact of the Economy on the Funding Processes  
Finance staff or staff intimately involved with the funding processes recognized 
the collaborative yet very complex nature of how the funding allocation or reduction 
decisions are made among the entire CSU constituency.  However, four of the 
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administrators at both the Campus and System Office shared that for the last five years, 
the economic downturn and the uncertainties it presents to the funding process 
compounds the complexity of funding process- related events and efforts of the CSU. 
During the last five years, both organizations experienced pressure to develop 
multiple funding scenarios to address budget shortfalls with very short notice. They were 
instructed to include drastic measures like furloughs, reduction of staff and faculty, 
enrollment freezes, cancellation of contracts, and streamlining purchasing of goods and 
services.   
 CSU, Campus - Administrator #2 stated: 
You can never be sure exactly in any given year and any given budget the 
final crazy decisions that are going to emerge out of the state capital and so 
we often find ourselves having to make lemonade out of lemons.  So you’re 
trying to fix problems that have been created because of the decision makers 
of Sacramento were moving too fast or weren’t interested in getting the 
universities full input on something and so the state capital ends up 
complicating the lives of the campuses a lot.  Not in a way a textbook or a 
dissertation can really sort through because the decision making process 
doesn’t follow a neat clean lines and to read a text book for example that 
states the budget is suppose to pass by June 15th each year and it does after the 
budget committees, the house, the assembly and the senate have each met and 
held hearings and etc, etc, etc, they form a committee to form any differences 
out…..that’s all the textbook says, but it in any particular year they may or 
may not follow that process.  This year is a good example, this year they 
didn’t follow that process at all.  The process that is spelled out in textbooks 
simply isn’t followed sometimes so the types of decisions that get made are 
affected by the process or the lack there of.  I’m just saying that life if more 
complex then you may imagine in terms of everything that has to be managed 
and balanced out. 
 
CSU, Campus - Administrator #1 said: 
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You know it’s [the economic situation] gotten so bad, I think that if we 
weren’t in the situation we were in now there would be very clear 
understanding of how those decisions are made but with the flux in the 
economy and the flux in all of the decisions that are being made there not 
being clearly articulated to… they may be articulated to the presidents but a 
lot of times that message doesn’t get down to the campus, we just see it and 
have deal with it. 
Benefits of a Healthy Bureaucratic System 
The CSU Campus and the CSU System Office are in constant communication and 
collaboration in order to respond to their constituents.  Minutes from the University 
Budget Committee, Memorandums from the CSU System Office Budget Office, reviews 
of both organizations’ charts, and responses from the administrators revealed that the 
CSU is governed by a healthy bureaucratic system.  In addition, the CSU System Office 
and the CSU campus websites clearly displayed who the key individuals and groups 
involved in the decision making process are as it relates to funding. The administrators 
from both organizations described the layers of the bureaucratic system in a positive 
manner and how having multiple groups to work out agreements and communications in 
a collaborative manner was beneficial to the funding process. 
CSU, System - Administrator #3 said: 
The presidents are important individuals in this whole process and they work 
directly with the board to make sure that the board priorities are workable 
from the campus level.  So their executive council meetings, for example, that 
occur that they are able to truly voice what they think the direction the CSU 
should be and they work directly with the chancellor and they’re 
communicating that to the board.  The vice presidents work directly with the 
presidents to make sure that whatever their vision is, is applicable to the 
financial decisions that we’re making centrally at the budget office and from 
there, there’s a structure where you have the administrative vice presidents 
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that will say whether or not that vision and those goals are implementable 
based on the tools that are available within the system.  So through that 
process, that interactive process between all of us, we’re able to work out 
agreement and communication… 
The Administrators spoke about this system in a positive way as a mechanism to 
understand and adhere to set priorities and expectations and to share resources. 
CSU, Campus - Administrator #2 said: 
We are so tightly governed, if you will, and I mean that in a positive way, 
because we’re given so many guidelines and restrictions and what we call also 
executive orders and those are some of our policies, priorities, so we have 
enough in place to keep us tightly regulated and informed. 
The event map provided a clearer representation of the funding process and 
expectations, the timing of events, the flow of information taking place during those 
events and who was involved in those events.  As an analysis tool, the event map assisted 
in the building of the case study description by providing an overall representation of the 
interactions between the CSU System Office and the CSU Campus. In chapter 5, a more 
detailed description of some of the key funding related events presented in this section 
are addressed. 
Content Analysis 
Yin (2003) outlines that qualitative data analysis consists of examining, 
categorizing, tabulating or otherwise recombining the data collected to address the initial 
focus of the case study. In this study, content analysis is used as a method of data 
analysis. Content analysis is a dynamic form of analysis of verbal and visual data that is 
oriented toward summarizing the informational contents of that data (Altheide, 1987; 
Morgan, 1993). Content analysis is used to develop objective inferences about a subject 
90 
of interest in any type of communication.  The process of content analysis consists of 
coding raw messages (ie, textual material, visual images, and illustrations) according to a 
classification scheme. The coding process involves organizing communication content in 
a manner that allows for easy identification, indexing, or retrieval of content relevant to 
research questions. Content components may be words, phrases, theories, topics, 
concepts, or other characteristics (Patton, 2002). Content analysis goes beyond counting 
words or pulling out objective content from texts to examine meanings, themes and 
patterns that may be manifest or latent in a particular text. It allows researchers to 
understand social reality in a subjective but scientific manner (Berg, 2001). 
In accordance with Berg’s (2001) procedural recommendations for content 
analysis, this content analysis began with coding and identifying manifest content. 
Manifest content is comprised of those elements that are physically present and can be 
counted (e.g. words, paragraphs, and people). All six interview transcriptions were coded 
to account for the participants’ responses and to eliminate the interviewer’s words.   
Table 8 shows the tabulation of all six respondents’ total word count, total paragraph 
count, length of the interview and the average of how many words were spoken per 
minute by each participant.   
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Table 7 
Manifest Content Analysis of Interview Transcriptions Words, Paragraphs, and Times for 
Six Participants. 
Participant Total 
Words 
Total 
Paragraph 
Length of 
interview 
(minutes) 
Average 
words per 
minute 
CSU, Campus – Administrator 1 5,823 57 55  105 
CSU, Campus – Administrator 2 4,741 40 40  118 
CSU, System – Administrator 3 3,024 27 36  84 
CSU, System – Administrator 4 2,326 30 27  86 
CSU, System – Administrator 5 2,693 54 28  96 
CSU, System – Administrator 6 3,100 31 35 89 
 
In reviewing this manifest content analysis, the data simply reflects the most 
talkative, the least talkative, the longest or shortest interview, and who spoke the most or 
least amount of words per minute. By reviewing Table 8, Administrator #2 spoke the 
most words by looking at the average words per minute column and Administrator #4 
spoke the least amount of words.  These observations provide very little evidence of the 
type of information obtained and nature of the participant’s responses.  This type of 
content analysis is used widely in mass communication as a way to count manifest textual 
elements, which is an aspect of this method that is often criticized for missing syntactical 
and semantic information embedded in the text (Weber, 1990).  
This content analysis goes beyond merely counting words. It extracts objective 
content from texts to examine meanings, themes and patterns that may be apparent or 
latent in a particular text. The latent content is an interpretative reading of the symbolism 
underlying the physical data (Berg, 2001).  
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In this step of the content analysis, I began by systematically applying the preset 
codes to words and paragraphs on the transcribed interviews considered relevant in 
capturing the essence of a preset code.  The Principal Agent framework was evoked to 
inform the development of the preset codes and their corresponding standard categories 
as presented in Table 6 on chapter 3. The Principal Agent Theory (PAT) Framework 
proposes that, in an organization to organization relationship, an agent will complete the 
work for a principal through some sort of agreement and/or contract (Eisenhardt, 1985). 
The notion that a contract or agreement should be present in agency relationships 
provides justification to the first preset code of “Contract” and its corresponding standard 
categories of “exist” and “doesn’t exist.”  The PAT framework goes on to explain that 
contracts can be explicit if in written form, implicit if in verbal form or a combination of 
both types. The second preset code of “Contract type” and its corresponding standard 
categories arises from this second theory tenet. The final aspect of PAT framework is that 
in Principal-Agent relationships problems tend to arise because of issues dealing with 
information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection or goal conflict, which are the 
last four preset codes. There can be information asymmetry, when one party has more or 
better information than the other which can lead to some degree of moral hazard and/or 
adverse selection.  Moral hazard is then when one party with the information it has, 
completes an action to the detriment of the other party or Adverse Selection when poor or 
bad results are achieved due to the type of information exchanged between the two 
parties.  These four concepts were defined in Chapter 2 and a brief summary is presented 
in a later section of this chapter in the findings summary. 
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As an example, the first interview question enabled me to categorize the 
responses for that question under the existence or absence of the contract preset code.  I 
asked participants at both organizations whether any contract or agreement with respect 
to funding allocations from the system office exists between the system office and CSU - 
Campus.  Based on the responses, I proceeded to code the transcriptions under a contract 
“exists” or “doesn’t exist”.  In this case, all six participants responded that a contract 
exists between the two organizations, however, the degree and type of contract varied: 
CSU, System - Administrator #3 stated: 
There are informal agreements meaning that when we give them funds for a 
particular full time student for example, they will do everything that they can 
to achieve those targets.  When we give them funds for various budget 
priorities established by the board because of the budget plan, we expect them 
to fulfill the obligations of those budget priorities.   
 
As presented in Table 9, each preset code includes a set of standard categories 
which helps to record the presence or absence of predetermined attributes.  I coded each 
participant’s transcribed interview looking for the preset codes and corresponding 
presence or absence of its standard categories.  Table 9 shows the frequency of all seven 
preset codes in each of the coded interviews. The level of frequency is not the important 
aspect of the table since participants might have mentioned that a contract exists in 
multiple examples throughout their dialogue.  Instead, the mention of a preset code 
and/or standard category by three or more of the participants was used to denote 
alignment between the two organizations. Miller and Crabtree (1992, p. 18) described 
this approach to analysis as the “template analysis style.'' In addition to the preset codes, 
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three additional categories emerged during the process of analysis. The preset codes and 
emergent codes results will be discussed later in the chapter.  
Table 8  
Latent Content Analysis: Frequency Table of Preset Codes 
Preset Codes Contract Contract 
Type 
Contract 
Detail 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Moral 
Hazard 
Adverse 
Selection 
Goal 
Conflict 
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CSU, Campus – 
Administrator 1 
5 0 0 0 5 1 2 3 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
CSU, Campus – 
Administrator 2 
1
2 
1 4 6 1 5 5 2 0 1 7 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 
CSU, System – 
Administrator 3 
5 0 5 4 2 4 3 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 
CSU, System – 
Administrator 4 
3 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSU, System – 
Administrator 5 
2 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSU, System - 
Administrator 6  
3 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The Atlas.ti software was used to support the coding process. It allowed me to 
code the data, retrieve text based on keywords, rename or merge existing preset codes 
without perturbing the rest of the codes, and generate visualizations of emergent codes 
and their relationships to one another (See Appendix H). Atlas.ti also maintains automatic 
logs of coding changes, which tracks the evolution of the analysis. 
Contract and Contract Type 
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Participants at both organizations felt that a contract or agreement exists between 
the two organizations.  However, that agreement is implicit in most areas, meaning there 
is no written document dictating how the two organizations ought to complete the 
funding process and what expectations they should have for one another.  In Figure 5, the 
plot shows respondents’ answers that fell into the categories for the existence of a 
contract or not, and the type of contract.  The plot does not account for the frequency of 
times the preset code was mentioned by the respondent but rather that the essence of the 
participant’s response reflected a particular preset code.  All participants’ responses 
support the idea that a contract exists between the two organizations and that the contract 
is not a comprehensive written document as shown in Figure 5, on the quadrant labeled 
Exist, Implicit. The quadrant labeled exists/explicit shows that respondents felt that 
written contracts exist between the two organizations.  For example: the submission of 
budget request reports, student fee reports and meeting legislative initiatives fall into this 
category of items agreed to in writing by the two organizations. The last two quadrants 
only had one respondent who expressed that a contract doesn’t exist because she obtained 
the information through a higher level administrator and thus didn’t see the actual 
agreements.   
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Contract (Exist) 
 
Respondent #2,3,4,6 
 
 
Exist, Explicit 
 
Respondent #1,2,3,4,5,6 
 
 
Exist, Implicit 
Type of Contract (Explicit) Type of Contract (Implicit) 
 
 
Respondent #2 
 
Doesn’t Exist/ Explicit 
 
 
Respondent #2 
 
Doesn’t Exist/Implicit 
Contract (Doesn’t Exist) 
 
Figure 5. Respondent Plot of Preset Codes for the Existence of a Contract and the 
Contract Type. Some participants are in more than one quadrant as their responses 
referred to different types of agreements. 
Participants in most cases believe that a contract exists between the two 
organizations and that the type and degree of the contract can vary according to the stage 
of the funding process or the type of funding in question.  For example, participants 
discussed that an explicit [written] contract exists in the area of enrollment targets for 
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funding purposes and an implicit [not written] contract exists in the area of lottery funds 
allocations which shows that different types of contracts exist for different funding 
sources or processes.  Participants felt that the level of contract detail in most cases is 
detailed and complete regardless of whether the contract is in written or not written form.  
CSU, System - Administrator #5 said: 
I guess I would say that the contract would be the expectation that they serve a 
particular enrollment level and that would be articulated in our allocation 
letters where we have through the negotiations between the CFO here and the 
campus president or the CFO on the campus they would reach an agreement 
about that level of FTE would be that the campus can serve and then we 
would articulate their funding based upon what that agreement is. 
CSU, Campus - Administrator #2 stated: 
As far as our general fund and what we call our lottery funds, and they truly 
are from the lottery proceeds, there’s no contracts, per se, or agreements.  
What the System office does is they provide us that information on the 
funding for the campuses… 
… Now as far as some other funding sources, sometimes we do have contracts 
or agreements with the Chancellor’s office for the campus and that would be 
say if we have a special program or special project where the Chancellor’s 
office will provide us funding to run a program, maybe like an international 
program or a study abroad program, some specialized program.  But your 
overall general allocations, no there’s no real contract or agreement per se. 
CSU, System - Administrator #4 said: 
No there is no formal contract or agreement, what there is really is a history of 
actions built over time and the result of that history of actions will change 
with respect to specific situations in specific fiscal years has resulted in the 
current funding allocation that we see.  And those allocations are 
communicated each year to the campuses in a form what’s called a coded 
memo that I sign and then the director of the budget office sign.  So I 
wouldn’t describe it as being a contract or agreement. 
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Information Asymmetry 
 The second question I asked participants was if the institution perceives that the 
System Office has attached expectations to the funds that it allocates to the institutions? 
And whether from the principal (System Office) or agent (institution) perspective, is the 
agent (institution) fulfilling their contracts? This question allowed me to categorize the 
responses with the presence or existence of any of the four issues that can arise in a 
Principal Agent relationship which are: information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse 
selection and/or goal conflict.   
The Principal Agent Framework refers to information asymmetry as a situation in 
which one party has more or better information than the other (Frederickson & Smith, 
2003).  It seems that both organizations are in alignment with one another and very little 
information asymmetry exists. Respondents attributed the alignment of both 
organizations to a constant flow of information and ease of finding readily available 
information online.  Expectations and consequences for not meeting expectations in 
regard to funding are documented through the CSU System Office Budget Office coded 
memos. 
Coded Memo B 2011-01 excerpt:  
The CSU funding adjustments in these allocations are based on SB 69 and SB 
70 that incorporate the Governor’s January budget adjustments for CSU. 
While these budget allocations are provided for planning purposes, it should 
be understood that allocations are subject to the possibility of major additional 
reductions in state support for 2011/12. We will continue to keep you 
informed of further developments. 
… This coded memo includes tuition fee revenue adjustments related to 
changes in enrollment patterns, full-year effect of 2010/11 tuition fee rate, 
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base enrollment changes, and the 10 percent tuition fee rate increase approved 
by the Board of Trustees for the 2011/12 academic year. The applicable 
resulting changes in financial aid related to the revenue adjustments are also 
displayed in Attachment D. For purposes of tuition fee revenue projections in 
this coded memo, the resident FTES is 331,716 FTES. 
CSU, System - Administrator #4 said: 
I think we have a good mix in the system between centralized decision 
makings and decentralized.  In other words, I think that the way that this 
system is wrong, has the right mix in terms of central direction of guidance 
but without going too far into micromanaging, things that are better managed 
at a campus level.  So don’t try to reach in and make decisions about what 
course scheduling is like or what mix of course offerings are or how many 
lecturers are being hired, so the day to day operational decisions are left to the 
campuses to do.  So because I think we have a pretty good balance between 
what we choose to give central direction on and what we choose to 
decentralize down to local level, I can’t think of anything off hand where we 
have a real miss alignment. 
 
Moral Hazard 
A moral hazard may occur where the actions of one party may change to the 
detriment of another after a transaction has taken place. In other words, the principal 
cannot be sure if the agent has put forth maximal effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). Participants 
provided very little evidence of moral hazard taking place in the CSU system.  If 
anything, a strong sentiment of collaboration was shared among participants and this 
supports the findings discovered through constructing the event map of a healthy 
bureaucratic system.  
CSU, System - Administrator #3 stated: 
I think that maybe, because we have 23 different campuses there might be 
differences of the expectation of how our goals are implemented or how they 
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should be implemented but we, the chancellor’s office recognizes that each of 
the campuses are individual and don’t expect them to do everything exactly 
the same but we do expect uniformity and standardization of how they 
approach the issue. 
 
Adverse Selection 
 Adverse Selection refers to a process in which “poor” or “bad” results occur when 
a principal and agents have asymmetric information (Bergen, 1992). There was very little 
evidence of adverse selection which is supported by the findings in the preset code for 
information asymmetry. The two organizations share information readily and understand 
the funding process and corresponding expectations. 
CSU, Campus - Administrator #2 stated: 
Well again, like I said, I think the chancellor’s office has a good 
understanding of what we go through because again they get that feedback 
from us on a regular basis. 
CSU, System - Administrator #5: 
I would say that because of the volatility of funding and training and all of 
that for the last five years, much more effort has had to go into 
communicating.  I wouldn’t say they’re not aligned I would say it’s just been 
a bit more confusing.   
 
Goal Conflict 
Goal Conflict is a situation in which principals’ and agents’ desires and interests 
concerning a task are in conflict and both prefer a different course of action (Petersen, 
1995). There was very little information provided to support instances where goal 
conflict existed between the System office and the CSU Campus selected for this study.  
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Two respondents mentioned that other larger CSU campuses showed a desired to go on a 
different direction in terms of enrollment targets in order to better serve the community 
where the campus is situated. Even in said scenario, the CSU System office seemed very 
flexible to adjusting enrollment targets for those campuses. Excerpts from administrator 
#4 and Administrator #5 revealed some goal conflict from other CSU campuses: 
CSU, System - Administrator #4 said: 
So external factors do play a roll so you can have a campus that is having a lot 
of demand being driven by their demographics of their service area and they 
may be in a service area where you’re seeing a real strong growth for example 
high school graduation, a number of students coming out of the high school in 
the area is way above the state average and that can be a factor that is making 
it hard for campus to avoid exceeding targets.  That does happen sometimes 
and we try to adjust for that.  We even adjust the target if we think it’s 
warranted, we’ve done that. 
CSU, System - Administrator #5 stated the following: 
I don’t think that it had to do with them deliberately seeking autonomy.  I 
think there are some campus president’s who choose, for whatever reason, 
ignore the rules and roll the dice.  Like in the case of a larger campuses did, 
they always want to be independent. 
 
Emergent Codes 
 
 Three types of emergent codes with accompanying categories were developed 
through the analysis of the data and coding process: Multiple Principals, Multiple Agents 
and Competing Agents. According to the Principal Agent Theory Framework, a single-
principal refers to a person or organization who enters into a transaction with another 
person/organization (agent) in an authoritative role (Eisenhardt, 1985). This is known as a 
single-principal single-agent relationship as described in chapter 2.  A Multiple-Principal 
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is an organization and/or person who enters into an authoritative role with more than one 
agent.  Multiple Agents are organizations and/or persons who enter into transactions with 
one or multiple principals. The third emergent code called “competing agents” was 
developed to denote instances where agents are in competition for resources with other 
agents who interact with the same principal. 
The first two emergent codes are interesting in that more than three of the six 
participants’ opinions fell into these themes as shown on table 10. The multiple agents’ 
emergent code was only mentioned by the administrators from the institution and not the 
system office. 
Table 9 
Latent Content Analysis: Emergent Codes 
Emergent Codes Multiple Principals Multiple Agents Competing Agents 
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CSU Campus administrator 1 x x x x x x x 
CSU Campus administrator 2 x   x x   
CSU System administrator 3   x    x 
CSU System administrator 4   x    x 
CSU System  administrator 5   x    x 
CSU System administrator 6   x    x 
 
Multiple Principals 
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 Five respondents shared that the California State legislature plays a significant 
authoritative role to the CSU System Office and also directly to the CSU Campus. As 
shown in Figure 6, the state legislature acts as a principal directly to the CSU System and 
to the CSU institution.  Both organizations seem to believe that they are required to report 
and address fiscal matters directly to the California State Legislature, including new 
and/or on-going priorities of serving the citizens of California via enrollment targets 
and/or through the implementation of politically driven budget agendas. 
CSU, Campus - Administrator #1 shared: 
A lot of the times we are getting directions both from the board of trustees and 
then we also get direction and required fiscal goals through the state 
legislation and through the department of finance and all of those kinds of 
things.  They are looking at outcomes as well as allocating out the resources 
so we are kind of, in essence supporting or demonstrating how we are 
achieving the goals of the board and then working with the state of California.  
CSU, System - Administrator #4 stated: 
…another thing is the extent of which our system is affected by the decisions 
that are made by the governor and the legislature.  The impact from the state 
capital is profound and those decisions are topped at an external factor and the 
external factor a profound impact that the decision making process that takes 
place in the capital is not a very neat and clean process.  It’s very heavily 
driven by political decisions and the extent in which the university is able to 
have media input in that the decisions varies from circumstance to 
circumstance and so sometimes you’re able to give input and you can get 
decisions out of the state capital that are at least reasonable and then other 
times you just get thrown a curveball where they aren’t interested in getting 
any outside input. 
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Figure 6. Illustration of Multiple Principal - Multiple Agent - Principal Agent Theory 
Relationship drawn from PAT Literature Review. The arrows indicate the flow of the 
contract components: principals oversee funding allocations and set expectations and agents 
report information on set expectations and perform/report tasks. 
Multiple Agents  
This emergent code was only mentioned by participants at the institution level. 
This is an area where further exploration or additional data through participant interviews 
would be beneficial. For this study, this area will be a recommendation for future 
research. 
Competing Agents  
 Participants from both organizations described instances where other CSU 
campuses required the set of enrollment target expectations to be adjusted, thus in return 
System Office 
(Principal/Agent) 
Institution 
(agent) 
State Legislature 
(Principal) 
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impacting funding throughout the whole CSU system.  The funding expectations for 
some of the campuses changed due to the size of the campus.  For the smaller campuses, 
it was a matter of getting a lower set of funding reductions without changes to the 
expectations since the campus had no additional resources or services to trim back. The 
larger campuses are then expected to cover the reductions for the smaller campuses, thus 
creating competing interests for the campuses.  The larger campuses are then required to 
meet their own set of expectations and somehow compensate for unexpected changes due 
to the needs of other campuses within the system as depict on figure 7.  
CSU, Campus - Administrator # 1 said: 
Now these last couple of allocations, last couple of budget reductions, some of 
these smaller campuses, they have been successful in negotiating with the 
Chancellor’s office to have a smaller cut, because they don’t have anywhere 
to go, they’re down to having a president part time kind of thing.  So they 
don’t have any more place to reduce their budget without really severely 
impacting their students.  So they’ve been in negotiations with some of the 
smaller campuses to take a smaller reduction and then have the larger 
campuses and middle size campuses pick that up.  So that’s been negotiated 
independently which of course from the campuses perspective, the larger 
campuses are getting hit harder than the smaller campuses and you 
know…there hasn’t been an explicit agreement as to what process, one might 
go through to, to ask for a smaller reduction, so it’s almost squeaky wheel gets 
the oil, that kind of a process right now.   
CSU, System - Administrator #5 stated: 
I don’t think that it had to do with them deliberately seeking autonomy.  I 
think there are some campus presidents who choose, for whatever reason, 
ignore the rules and roll the dice.  Like in the case of one of the larger CSU 
did, they always want to be independent. 
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Figure 7. Illustration of Principal Agent Theory (PAT) Single Agent to Single Principal with 
Competing Agents’ Relationship Model. The contract components are the areas where the 
circles interconnect: principal oversees funding allocations and sets expectations and agents 
report information on set expectations and perform/report tasks. The competing agents strive 
for resources from the principal, but mainly other agents. 
Summary 
This chapter described the development of the case event map and the content 
analysis procedures employed in this study. The goal was to identify important themes or 
categories within a body of content, and to provide a rich description of the funding 
processes created by those themes/categories as they are lived out in the two 
organizations as a setting. Through careful data preparation, coding, and interpretation, 
the results of content analysis support the development of new concepts and models, as in 
Other Institutions 
(Competing 
Agents/Agents) 
System Office 
(Principal) 
Institution  
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Agent/Agent) 
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the case of the emergent codes, as well as validate existing theories and provide thick 
descriptions of a particular setting or case.  The next Chapter provides a description of the 
case study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CASE DESCRIPTION: THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM’S 
OFFICE AND THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS FUNDING 
PROCESSES & EXPECTATIONS 
This chapter, shaped by the data and analysis of chapter four, is a narrative of the 
case of the California State University System Office and the California State University 
Campus funding allocations processes and expectations.  A “single narrative” (Yin, 2009, 
p. 170) funneling approach (Creswell, 2007) is used throughout the chapter to present the 
case by describing a brief history and structure for each organization. The next section 
depicts the funding story between the two organizations by presenting an overall 
representation of how the funding allocations processes and expectations take place and 
the final section provides a connection of the case to the Principal Agent Theory 
framework. 
California State University System Office Profile 
The California State University (CSU) has a rich 50 year history and a reputation 
as the first multi-campus system of institutions in the United States. In 1960, the 
inception of the California Master Plan for Higher Education positioned California to 
become the first state to develop a coherent public higher education system. It established 
a tripartite structure consisting of the nation’s first network of public community 
colleges, a set of regional teachers’ state colleges and the nation’s first multi-campus state 
university and the University of California (UC) (Richardson, 1997; Douglass, 2002). 
Today, this tripartite system includes the California Community Colleges, the California 
State University and the University of California.  
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The individual California State Colleges were brought together as a system by the 
Donahoe Higher Education Act of 1960. In 1972, the system became the California State 
University and Colleges, and in 1982, the system became The California State University 
(CSU). Today, the campuses of the CSU include twenty-three campuses and eight off-
campus centers stretching from San Diego in the south to Humboldt in the north (see map 
in Appendix G). The Chancellor's Office, also known as the System Office, is the central 
headquarters and is located in Long Beach, California. While each of the campuses has 
its own identity, its own distinct student populations and programs, they all share the 
same mission as part of the California State University—to provide high quality, 
affordable higher education to meet the ever-changing needs of the people of California 
(calstate.edu, 2011). 
The California State University System has approximately 433,000 students, 
44,000 faculty and staff, and currently offers approximately 1,233 bachelor’s degree 
programs, 783 master’s programs, and 29 joint doctoral programs in 319 areas. CSU 
prepares the majority of the state’s new public school teachers and 10 percent of the 
nation's K-12 instructors. Each year, nearly as many people graduate with bachelor’s 
degrees from the CSU as from all other universities and colleges in the state of California 
combined. 
Organizational Structure & Leadership: System Office 
This section describes how the leaders (who occupy different positions in System 
Office and University Campus) who were interviewed for the study are connected to one 
another. The section also details the reporting structure between the system and the 
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institutions and the roles of interviewees as well as those relevant to the case 
investigation. The target interviewees from the System Office included the Chancellor, 
the Vice Chancellor for Business and Finance, the Assistant Vice Chancellor for Budget, 
and the Budget Director. Due to his preparations to retire after 14 years of service to the 
CSU, the Chancellor was unable to participate in the study and in his place the Chief of 
Staff was included in the study. 
The California State University System Office is led by the Chancellor, who is 
appointed by the Board of Trustees. The 25-member Board of Trustees, the majority of 
whom are appointed by the California Governor to eight-year terms, is responsible for the 
oversight of the California State University System. Faculty, alumni and two student 
trustees serve two-year terms. The California Governor is designated as the President of 
the Board of Trustees, the State of California General Counsel serves as Secretary, and 
the State of California Chief Financial Officer as Treasurer. Other officers, including the 
board's chair and vice chair, are elected by board members for one-year terms. 
The CSU Board of Trustees adopts rules, regulations, and policies governing the 
California State University. The board has authority over curriculum development, use of 
property, development of facilities, and fiscal and Human Resources management. The 
CSU Board of Trustees meets six times per year. Board meetings allow for 
communication among the Trustees, Chancellor, Campus Presidents, executive 
committee members of the statewide Academic Senate, representatives of the California 
State Student Association, and officers of the statewide Alumni Council.  
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The Trustees appoint the Chancellor, the system’s Chief Executive Officer. The 
Board of Trustees, in partnership with the Chancellor, selects, appoints, and evaluates the 
Presidents of the campuses of the California State University who report to the 
Chancellor. The Trustees, Chancellor and Presidents develop system-wide policy, with 
campus implementation taking place through a broadly based consultative process 
(Gerth, 2010; www.calstate.edu, 2012).  
As the System’s Chief Executive Officer, the Chancellor oversees an overall 
annual budget of more than $5 billion. The Chancellor is charged with coordinating 
system-wide functions and communicating with the Board of Trustees. The Chancellor 
also represents the CSU to state and national policymakers and leads system-wide federal 
relations and communications. The Chancellor is charged with leading the Executive 
Council, whose membership includes twenty-three CSU Presidents, four CSU System 
Office Vice Chancellors and representatives for the System Office Budget Office.  The 
Council is charged with assisting campuses and presidents in carrying out the CSU 
mission.   
Since the Chancellor was unable to participate in the study, the CSU Chief of 
Staff was interviewed.  In her role, she is a “conductor to a wide range of special projects 
and the in-resident expert that assists in keeping things running smoothly” (Chief of Staff 
Interview). She edits a variety of board and legislative reports and communiques, works 
closely with Human Resources on personnel matters, and interacts with the CSU 
campuses, primarily as a coordinator getting reports and resources to flow information 
between the two organizations and to the right individuals. 
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At the System Office level, the CSU Board of Trustees, upon recommendation by 
the Chancellor, appoints and evaluates the System Office Vice Chancellors, General 
Counsel and University Auditor. The four System Office Vice Chancellors report directly 
to the Chancellor, and the General Counsel and University Auditor report jointly to the 
Chancellor and the Board.  The System Office Vice Chancellors include: Vice Chancellor 
for Academic Affairs, Vice Chancellor for Business and Finance, Vice Chancellor for 
University Relations and Advancement and Vice Chancellor for Human Resources (See 
Appendix D: System Office organizational chart).  
The role of the System Office Vice Chancellors as executive staff is to develop 
and coordinate system-wide policy and programs in areas such as budget, technology, 
academic affairs, business affairs, institutional research, physical plant development, 
employee relations, state and federal governmental affairs, legal affairs, university 
advancement (development and fundraising), communications and public affairs. 
The Vice Chancellor for Business and Finance and Chief Financial Officer 
(VCBF/CFO) is one of the key positions interviewed in this study. He oversees five 
divisions within the System Office: Budget Office, Capital Planning, Design and 
Construction, Financial Services, Information Technology Services and Risk 
Management & Public Safety.  One of the roles of the VCBF/CFO is to be a non-voting 
member of the Executive Council in order to provide support and guidance in matters 
related to any of the divisions under his jurisdiction.  
The Vice Chancellor for Business and Finance provides leadership of increasingly 
urgent system-wide priorities such as: the continuing design and implementation of 
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Operational Excellence; the CSU’s continued initiatives to reduce costs and assist the 
campuses to improve operations; stabilization of the budget; and the establishment of a 
sustainable financial model for the future. 
Under the auspice of the Vice Chancellor for Business and Finance, the Budget 
Office is closely involved with all of the CSU campuses, supporting and providing 
guidance in matters related to funding.  The Budget Office is charged with the 
development, interpretation and communication of CSU budgetary policy and procedures 
for system-wide resources. The CSU Budget Office provides information regarding the 
status of CSU support budget and finance issues by fiscal year, CSU enrollment and fee 
information as it relates to annual budget development, and implementation by CSU 
campuses and constituents. The Assistant Vice Chancellor for Budget (AVCB) and the 
Budget Director (BD) were both interviewed as part of this study.  The AVCB is in 
charge of the CSU Budget Office.  His roles include the preparation and coordination of 
Legislative Hearings/Reports, CSU Budget Status Reports, Board of Trustees 
presentations and agenda items, in addition to supporting the Trustees’ budget message 
and content.  The AVCB is an active member of the System Budget Advisory 
Committee, the Vice Chancellor for Business and Finance Budget Team, the 
Intersegmental Coordinating Council and the Chief Administrators and Business Officers 
(CABO) group.  
CABO is a group composed of the twenty-three-campus Vice Presidents / CFOs 
from across the California State University. The group meets bi-monthly to review 
current system-wide and campus issues and to provide advice to the system Chief 
Financial Officer and senior Human Resources officer. The range of subject matter 
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considered by the group includes the state support budget, capital design and 
construction, investment, insurance, financial reporting, and others. There are several 
functional groups in the CSU that report through CABO including the financial officers, 
auxiliary organizations, human resources and facilities. 
Under the leadership of the Assistant Vice Chancellor for Budget, the Budget 
Office includes two professional and four functional staff (See Appendix E).  The Budget 
Director, who is next in charge after the AVC for Budget, was also interviewed. He is 
responsible for developing Budget Fact Sheets and Compact Revenue Projections, 
providing leadership for Systems Account Management, coordination of the Governor’s 
Budget Schedule Cycle for the System Office, as well as developing content for 
Legislative Reports and Trustees’ Budget messages.  This position is also a Funding 
Opportunity Announcement (FOA) Delegate and a member of the System Budget 
Advisory Committee and the EVC/CFO Budget Team.  
The three positions described in this section are closely involved with all 
functional aspects related to funding allocations and expectations from the CSU System 
Office, and they provided insightful information that is presented in the last section of 
this chapter. 
The next section is a description of the CSU Campus organizational structure and 
leadership and the last section of this chapter depicts the funding processes from the 
accounts of finance administrators from the CSU System Office interviews, CSU Campus 
Finance Administrators interviews and public documents reviewed.  
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The California State University Campus Profile 
A single institution from the CSU system was selected to be part of the case 
study. The institution selected for purposes of this study will be called the California 
State University Campus, or CSU Campus, a small-medium size campus within the CSU 
system.  
The California State University Campus is a four-year public university located 
just minutes from downtown Los Angeles and South Bay beaches. A bill signed by 
Governor Pat Brown in 1960 initiated planning for the CSU Campus and actual classes 
began in 1965, with an enrollment of twenty-seven freshmen and fourteen juniors.  The 
CSU Campus first commencement took place in the summer of 1967 with four graduates.  
The CSU Campus is a comprehensive, urban public university with the Carnegie 
classification (2010) of a Masters I institution, awarding degrees through the Masters and 
Specialist level. The California State University, Campus is accredited by the Accrediting 
Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities of the Western Association of Schools 
and Colleges (WASC). The university offers 45 undergraduate majors, 24 master's 
degrees and a number of certificate and credential programs. Supporting these programs 
are 39% full time and 61% part time faculty. The top three undergraduate majors at the 
University are Business Administration, Liberal Studies (teacher education program) and 
Nursing. Presently, it is also designated as a Hispanic Serving Institution 
(www.csudh.edu, 2012). 
The CSU Campus is among the most ethnically diverse universities in the United 
States, with a student population that is 47.4 percent Hispanic/Latino; 21.4 percent 
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Black/African American; 16.2 percent Caucasian; 11.6 percent Asian or Pacific Islander; 
0.4 percent American Indian; and 3.1 percent two or more races. Immigrant and visa 
students on the campus represent 94 countries. 
Organizational Structure and Leadership: CSU Campus 
The California State University Campus is led by the President. The President as 
the Chief Executive Officer is charged with the authority and responsibility, with 
appropriate consultation, consistent with Trustee and Chancellor’s policy, and applicable 
law, for the appropriate management of campus operations. The President oversees the 
development of curricular and instructional plans and the development of campus 
priorities by working with the entire campus community.  The President is charged with 
oversight of hiring and support of staff and teaching faculty, oversight and adjustment of 
campus fees in accordance with applicable policy, oversight of the campus advancement 
function, including alumni affairs and oversight and responsibility for campus auxiliary 
organizations. The President reports to the Chancellor and keeps him regularly informed 
as to the activities on their campuses (www.calstate.edu, 2012). The CSU Campus 
President oversees an estimated annual operating budget of $167 million. 
The California State University Campus organizationally is made up of five major 
offices. These administrative offices work together in a variety of ways to provide 
services, resources and support for the campus and community.  The five offices include 
the President’s Office, Academic Affairs, Student Affairs, University Advancement, and 
Administration and Finance.   
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For this study, the top two executive administrators from the Administration and 
Finance Division were interviewed: the Vice President for Finance and Administration 
(VPFA) and the Associate Vice President for Finance and Administration (AVPFA).  The 
division of Administration and Finance’s goal is to provide the CSU campus with prudent 
financial guidance and management of the University's fiscal resources. This division is 
responsible for the planning, development, and administration of funds appropriated to 
CSU campus. The Division supports both management and end users campus-wide in 
administering and understanding the budget.   
The Vice President for Finance and Administration (VPFA) oversees the 
following departments on campus: Foundation, Budget Planning and Administration, 
Police and Parking Services, Information Technology, Human Resources, Procurements 
and Contracts, Physical Plant and Facilities Planning and Construction. The VPFA is part 
of the system wide CABO group and prepares reports and responses on behalf of the 
campus to the system office on any matters related to Finance and Administration. 
The Associate Vice President for Administration and Finance is responsible for 
providing leadership to all areas of the Division of Administration and Finance with 
direct responsibility for: Accounting and Student Financial Services, Cashier’s Office, 
Payroll, Budget Planning and Administration, Business Process Management (auditing, 
non-resident tax, strategic planning, quality improvement, division policy development), 
and Risk Management Environmental Health and Occupational Safety. 
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CSU Campus – Administrator #2 stated: 
My administration part involves other area like business process 
improvement; I do the strategic report and some of these other areas that don’t 
necessarily involve finance. 
The next section presents the funding story: a description of the funding processes 
and expectations between the CSU Campus and the CSU System Office.  This case 
description provides insight as to how the funding processes actually takes place as 
perceived by the staff interviewed for this study at the CSU Budget Office, the CSU 
Campus Administration and Finance Division and from the review of public documents. 
The Funding Story 
The funding story between the CSU System Office and one of its campuses defies 
a simple definition.  It is a process rather than a product.  The size and complexity of the 
California State University system and the dynamics of the process make it difficult to 
establish and maintain an orderly process; however, great effort goes into the production, 
inclusion of constituents and development of a somewhat defined funding process. 
CSU System – Administrator #4 shared: 
The funding process that is spelled out in textbooks simply isn’t followed 
sometimes so the types of decisions that get made are affected by the process 
or the lack thereof.  I am just saying that life is more complex than you may 
imagine in terms of everything that has to be managed and balanced out. 
Each spring, the funding story between the two organizations begins at the 
campus level with the University Budget Committee work.  The committee was 
established at the campus back in 2003 by the former campus President to review and 
assess programs and determine program priorities to guide resource allocation. The goal 
of the President was to establish an open forum, inclusive of widespread consultation, by 
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having the decision-makers adhere to a University perspective rather than a divisional 
perspective in determining budget recommendations to the President. 
Excerpt from PM 00-03 (Revised) 
The University Budget Committee (UBC) includes representation from each 
division of the University. The President will appoint members of the UBC in 
its initial year of operation after appropriate consultation. In subsequent years, 
the President will appoint a faculty member as the Chair based on 
recommendations from the University Planning Committee, the Academic 
Senate Executive Committee and other appropriate groups. Normally the new 
chair will be either an understudy who continues as chair, or a continuing 
member from the previous year. Where this is not possible, the President, in 
consultation as described above, shall appoint a new chair. The Academic 
Senate Executive Committee, with consultation from the Provost or designee, 
will appoint two faculty members as they are needed. The Provost and the 
Vice Presidents of the other divisions will each appoint one member (other 
than themselves) to UBC. These appointees shall be identified from 
individuals who have had previous experience with budgets. The Associated 
Students Inc. Executive Committee shall appoint one student representative to 
UBC. Divisional budget/fiscal officers shall be appointed to UBC as 
nonvoting ex officio members. 
The University Budget Committee (UBC) charge states that staff from the 
Administrative and Finance division, specifically the Associate Vice President for 
Administration and Finance (AVPAF), who participated in this study, shall provide 
support to the committee.  The UBC initiates the committee work by issuing a call to all 
University divisions for assessment, planning and resource allocation reports. After 
receipt of these reports, the UBC hears presentations from all divisions, including the 
Administration and Finance division, to support their budget requests. The two 
individuals from Administration and Finance who participated in this study provide 
administrative support to this committee in addition to testifying about the 
Administration and Finance Division’s needs and priorities.  Typically, the Vice 
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President for Administration and Finance (VPAF) will present to the committee since the 
AVPAF is a non-voting member and is the support staff appointed to the UBC. As an 
example, during the last UBC presentations, the Administration and Finance division 
took a total reduction of about 3% of its base budget. 
Excerpt from UBC Final Recommendation Memorandum - May 21, 2012: 
2) Administration and Finance. We accepted Recommendations AF1 through 
AF3 and part of AF4 from the plan presented to UBC by the Vice President 
for Administration and Finance (A&F) on April 26, 2012. The total reduction 
proposed for A&F is $499,379 or 3.79% of their baseline budget. 
The UBC makes recommendations regarding existing programs that should be 
supported, existing programs that should not be supported, new programs that should be 
supported, and resource allocations. These recommendations are in response to proposals 
from division heads and Program Effectiveness Councils. After its deliberations, the 
UBC forwards its recommendations to the University Planning Committee (UPC) and to 
the President, who consults with appropriate groups prior to announcement of the annual 
resource allocation plan or campus budget request.  
The University Planning Council (UPC), established upon the recommendation of 
the Mission, Goals, and Directions Committee in 1999, includes representatives from all 
campus segments. Its purpose is to advise the President concerning the University’s 
progress in fulfilling its mission and achieving its goals. The UPC leads the campus in 
focusing on short- and long-term goals based on needs assessment, and assures that the 
process of strategic planning operates consistently and continuously throughout the 
campus. The UPC reviews the UBC’s final recommendations and provides advice and 
feedback to the President where appropriate. 
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Typically, in the early summer months, the University President will accept, reject 
or adjust the UBC’s final recommendations and submit the final University Budget Plan 
to the UBC, the campus and the System Office. The budget plan submission and data 
exchange via reports from the campus to the System Office evoke the first stages of 
interaction between the two organizations in this study as depicted in the Chapter 4 event 
map. Participants shared that the campuses are in constant interaction with the System 
Office via various reports throughout the fiscal year; however, communications occur 
more often during the budget request and planning period. 
CSU System – Administrator #5 stated the following: 
… they do have to submit their financial expenditure information to us so we 
can consolidate financial statements so we do what’s called a legal close 
where they report their expenditures in a way that allows us to report them to 
the state and then we flip that data around and we turn it into a report for our 
consolidated financial statements.  They submit enrollment data to us 
probably six times a year, they report on how they’re using their facilities and 
the square footage in their facilities to us on an annual basis, there is a large 
amount of information exchange from the campuses to the chancellor’s office 
in particular during the budget cycle period. 
During the University budget request planning, the University President is also 
engaged at the system level and through the Executive Council in discussions to develop 
a list of system- wide priorities for the subsequent fiscal year.  In this matter, the 
President is in a position to relate back to the campus, upcoming system priorities and 
expectations.  
CSU System – Administrator #3 said: 
…the executive council meets periodically and it consists of the twenty three 
presidents, the chancellor, and the chancellor’s executive staff and so a lot of 
policy and decisions are worked out in those discussions and they then get 
translated down to the lower levels of the organization including the financial 
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side of the house.  And the system CFO sits in the executive council so he’s 
present in all these meetings with the presidents and I’m also in those 
meetings. 
The Executive Council is part of a network of committees and councils 
coordinated by the CSU System Office and established to conduct the complex 
consultative process to develop and implement policy and priorities for the system. The 
system-wide Executive Council includes the twenty-three CSU campus presidents as 
voting members, the System Office Vice Chancellor for Finance and Administration, the 
System Office Assistant Vice Chancellor for Budget and the System Office Budget 
Director as non-voting members, and the Chancellor as the Chair.  The Executive 
Council group serves as a conduit for CSU Presidents to maintain a close working 
relationship with the CSU System Office and the Chancellor. Additionally, the Executive 
Council is the initial group to engage in discussions about system priorities, needs and 
expectations prior to preparing a budget request for the entire CSU system.   
CSU System – Administrator #3 explained the following: 
It’s an opportunity for the various CFO’s to talk to each other and compare 
notes and say “here’s how we’re handling this problem on my campus” you 
know, maybe someone else says “I’d like to learn more about that because 
that can help me with a similar situation,” so it really is a good support forum 
as well as an exchange of information forum.  But I think what this also goes 
to show is that the process by which the Chancellor’s office communicates 
with the campuses is that it’s actually pretty complex.  And it doesn’t simply 
take place in the form of memos that are handed from up high.  And just like 
there are the regular meetings with the CFO’s, the Chancellor meets on a 
regular basis with the twenty-three campus presidents via the Executive 
Council. 
Participants indicated that an outcome of the Executive Council is to agree upon a 
set of priorities and expectations for the new fiscal year.  Documented agreed upon 
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priorities are related back to the campuses via memos while other priorities are verbally 
agreed to, based on the current Chancellor’s management style. 
CSU System – Administrator #3 said: 
…it may simply be that the Chancellor has a certain priority of attention that 
he wants to press of a particular issue, and rather than just issue a memo about 
it and as you know there are enough memo’s flying back and forth with the 
bureaucracy anyway, and simply use the opportunity you have and say OK 
look this is something that is particularly important to us, you need to give this 
personal attention when you get back to campus and I’d like you to call me 
back next week and report to me on this.  So a lot of it happens in that way.  
That’s part of his management style.  My observations of the presidents are 
that I think it’s a very good way of working and the Chancellor has been the 
Chancellor for fourteen years now and he’s retiring soon. 
Other groups and committees supported by the System Office include the System-
wide academic senate, the system-wide Student Alliance, and the Chief Administrators 
and Business Officers Group (CABO). The CABO group composed of twenty-three CSU 
campuses CFO’s deals with a wide range of issues from Human Resources and system-
wide initiatives to budget matters.  In regard to funding, CABO is the forum where the 
Vice Presidents for Administration and Finance discuss and prepare ideas on how to deal 
with the outcome of the budget request.  
CSU System – Administrator #5 said: 
That is one way, I mean we have ongoing discussions and they’re actually 
quite frequent and we have regular meetings between the Chief Financial 
Officer of the university system, who is my boss.  There are regular meetings 
held with that group, which is referred to CABO, Chief Administrative 
Business Officers.  And so an awful lot of communication that takes place is 
through those verbal discussions, and it’s back and forth so the systems CFO 
is receiving information and advice from the campuses and using that to help 
fashion the direction that he wants to give them and that also ultimately gets 
placed on paper in various forms including the coded memo. 
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The AVP’s have a functional group that discusses how to prepare their campuses 
for the upcoming budget cycle. 
CSU Campus – Administrator #2 said: 
We are a system we’re all independent campuses but we do have a good 
support mechanism in place, I’ll give you an example, my group, my 
Associate Vice President’s group, we meet almost monthly and I’m chair of 
my officers group and we meet on a regular basis so we’re talking with the 
Chancellor’s office people constantly.  Whether it’s the budget office, 
accounting office, HR office, technology.  We’re in constant communication 
with them on finding out what’s new, what’s coming down, what are we 
doing, how are we changing, what’s legislation going to say to us, you know, 
how do we report our financial audits, you know so we’re in constant 
communication with them on the expectations at the campus level. 
The list of priorities, along with the budget plan developed through the work of 
the various Governance and Functional CSU groups and its constituencies, is submitted 
to the CSU Board of Trustees via the Chancellor for approval in order to become the 
budget plan for the entire CSU system for the next fiscal year.   
CSU System – Administrator #4 shared: 
Yeah that’s through consultation with all the CSU constituency groups, the 
campuses, the Chancellor speaks with each CSU constituency groups, 
members of the board, members of the public, alumni, student’s, the faculty 
and staff and discuss what a reasonable expectation of revenue is for the next 
fiscal year and within the context of reasonable expectations of revenue what 
budget priorities should the university be addressing.  And there’s a laundry 
list, there’s usually a laundry list of things that we could be doing.  Based on 
those conversations, which happen throughout, I’d say mid June through mid 
September throughout those conversations, budget priorities for the board are 
established.  So then we go to the board with a list of priorities that have been 
identified after consultation with the constituency groups and then the board 
decides what priorities they want to pursue in the budget year, meaning what 
they want to put in their November budget requests. 
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The CSU Board of Trustees’ approved budget request is then submitted to the 
California Governor’s office via the CSU Chancellor. The California Governor reviews 
and considers all public agencies’ resource needs and priorities, with all the ramifications 
and influences of political interactions, relationships with federal and local governments, 
public input, natural events, legal issues, the economy, initiatives and legislation and 
approves a final budget.  The Governor’s budget is typically approved and published in 
early fall. 
The System Level Budget Office is in charge of providing the CSU campuses 
information regarding fiscal year budgets or other legislative directives through official 
memos called Coded Memos. The CSU Budget Office distributes to the campuses via 
Coded Memos the projected budget allocations for each campus based on the priorities 
set by the CSU Board of Trustees and the California’s Governor’s approved budget plan. 
CSU, System - Administrator #4 stated: 
…So the board approves the budget in November.  They approve a budget 
plan and it becomes a budget request to the state and it says to the state here’s 
how much money we need from you in order to do things you want us to do 
under the master plan for the next year.  The Governor would then track his 
budget which identifies how much of that plan can be funded.  How much he 
thinks it should be provided.  At that point and time the Central Budget Office 
will put out an allocation memo to the campus saying that based on the 
Governor’s budget plan here’s how the allocations will work for your campus 
given the priorities that have been established by the board [Board of 
Trustees] for the fiscal year. That coded memo is planning for the campuses 
so that they can then start organizing their budgets are around the priorities 
that are listed within the coded memo and any additional needs the campus 
has for the fiscal year. 
 Once the final budget allocations are shared with the campuses, the System Office 
and the twenty-three campuses commence the process of planning their budget 
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allocations or reductions based on set enrollment targets and financial obligations, and 
they begin to develop strategies to meet the expectations of the Budget Plan for the next 
fiscal year.  
CSU, System – Administrator #4 said: 
Again, some of it is communicated as I indicated verbally by the Chancellor 
and the Executive Council or by the CFO CABO meeting.  But in many cases, 
depending on the specific issue, after the discussion of these forums there will 
be a follow-up memo.  So for example, an important part of the fiscal goals 
and expectations are the enrollment levels.  So from a system perspective, 
there needs to be some way every year saying ok here’s the goals we have in 
regards to any students we can enroll and there has to be some alignment, 
there has to be some relationship of how much state funding you have and 
how many students you serve because if you have those things get out of 
alignment with each other on result is that you could end up watering down 
the quality of the academic programs to a drastic extent, to an intolerable 
extent and without having some system you could for example have 
individual campuses that decide well I’m gonna take a short run rather than a 
long term perspective at this and I know that in the short run by admit more 
students I’ll be able to bring in more fee revenue.  Right?  And in the short 
run, with that additional revenue I can actually offer additional course sections 
because I can just hire part time lecturers at a cheap rate to do the course 
sections.  Now, so there could be a temptation at a campus level to go and 
over enroll.  To enroll in a level that’s really beyond what something from the 
state would indicate is a current level. 
The CSU as a system is able to get through the bureaucratic aspects of the funding 
process by having the right combination of centralized and decentralized functions and 
allowing the individual campuses to manage how to implement changes at the campus 
level while meeting system wide expectations. 
CSU System – Administrator #3 shared: 
I think we have a good mix in the system between centralized decision 
makings and decentralized.  In other words, I think that the way that this 
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system is ran has the right mix in terms of central direction of guidance but 
without going too far into micromanaging, things that are better managed at a 
campus level.   
In this stage, the funding expectations for some of the campuses changed due to 
the size of the campus.  The smaller campuses received a lower set of funding reductions 
without changes to expectations since the campuses had no additional resources or 
services to trim back. The larger campuses were expected to cover the reductions for the 
smaller campuses, thus creating competing interests for the campuses.  The larger 
campuses were also required to meet their own set of expectations and somehow 
compensate for unexpected changes due to the needs of the smaller campuses. 
CSU, Campus - Administrator # 1 said: 
Now these last couple of allocations, last couple of budget reductions, some of 
these smaller campuses, they have been successful in negotiating with the 
Chancellor’s office to have a smaller cut, because they don’t have anywhere 
to go, they’re down to having a president part time kind of thing.  So they 
don’t have any more place to reduce their budget without really severely 
impacting their students.  So they’ve been in negotiations with some of the 
smaller campuses to take a smaller reduction and then have the larger 
campuses and middle size campuses pick that up.  So that’s been negotiated 
independently which of course from the campuses perspective, the larger 
campuses are getting hit harder than the smaller campuses and you 
know…there hasn’t been an explicit agreement as to what process, one might 
go through to, to ask for a smaller reduction, so it’s almost squeaky wheel gets 
the oil, that kind of a process right now.   
Connecting the Case to the Principal Agent Theory Framework 
The Principal Agent Theory (PAT) Framework suggests that, in an organization 
to organization relationship, an agent will complete the work for a principal through some 
sort of agreement and/or contract (Eisenhardt, 1985). In this study, an agency relationship 
exists by virtue of exploring how one organization interacts with the other organization’s 
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expectations and deadlines related to funding. As shown earlier in this chapter, the CSU 
campus behaves as an agent by completing budgeting, planning, and reporting, in order to 
meet the CSU System Office expectations as set forth in formal funding deadlines. In 
essence the CSU System Office then acts as a principal to the CSU Campus in the 
relationship.  
During this study’s interviews; a CSU campus administrator shared that the two 
organizations work diligently to achieve funding deadlines and meet expectations: “In my 
opinion, I think that the system office and the campuses work closely together on the 
funding allocations (CSU Campus Administrator 2 - interview)”.  
Additional case evidence supporting the notion of the two organizations 
collaborative nature when dealing with funding allocations and expectations came from a 
comprehensive review of documents from the CSU campus and the CSU System Office.  
The CSU Campus Blue Books and the CSU Campus University Budget Committee 
(UBC) website provide to campus constituents with funding related terminologies and 
methodologies set forth by the CSU System Office and the CSU campuses.  The CSU 
Campus - University Budget Committee website includes current and archival 
information on the campus internal processes of reviewing the campus budget and 
developing yearly budget recommendation to the President for submission to the CSU 
System Office.  The UBC website also includes the final approved budget documents 
from the CSU System Office. The CSU System Office website includes a fiscal year 
calendar to guide and alert CSU campuses of major deadlines for funding related reports 
and Board of Trustees meetings timelines. Final budget summaries, reporting 
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instructions, enrollment information and student fees data is also readily available on the 
CSU System Office website which assisted in developing this case. 
The first aspect of the Principal Agent Theory framework is that a contract or 
agreement must be present in agency relationships to exist. Participants felt that 
agreements exist between the two organizations for receiving funds connected to 
enrollment targets and for funding special projects. One CSU Campus administrator 
emphasized this point by offering:  
Sometimes we do have contracts or agreements with the Chancellor’s office for 
the campus and that would be say if we have a special program or special project 
where the Chancellor’s office will provide us funding to run a program, maybe 
like an international program or a study abroad program, some specialized 
program.   
In agency relationship, contracts can be explicit if in written form (e.g. written 
budget and funding deadlines), implicit if in verbal form or a combination of both types. 
In this case, participants’ shared that funding requirements are not always explicit: 
implicit agreements exist in receiving funds connected to meeting enrollment target 
expectations. A CSU system administrator stated that: 
Informal agreements come with the allocations of funds to the campuses so we 
expect the campuses to carry the informal agreements out.  There is no formal, 
there’s nothing formally written that identifies that.   
The PAT framework states that if a contract exists then there are varying levels of 
details.  Some contracts include all the expectations that must be met by the agent (CSU 
Campus) in order to receive resources; this type of contract would be considered 
complete.  Other contracts with varying degrees of detail that speak to expectations 
between the principal and agent are considered incomplete or a combination of the two 
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types. Participants’ share that the level of detail included in the verbal agreements is very 
complete and clear. 
CSU Campus – Administrator #2 
So you know it’s very clear to understand when you do receive the funds, 
what your expectations are as far as providing service and providing quality 
programs and graduating the students in a timely manner and addressing new 
programs and new innovative ideas, technology and so forth.  So it’s you 
know the expectation is there, it may not always be very clear or in writing but 
you’re very clear to know what you’re expected to do with the funds that 
you’re provided. 
Another campus administrator shared that the System Office expectations are very 
clear to the campuses specially when dealing with enrollment targets.  
CSU Campus – administrator #1 
The chancellor’s office doesn’t like that; they definitely tell us what our 
enrollment target is.  And it’s definitely an expectation that it’s a goal and 
that’s a very clearly defined goal that we are required to adhere to. 
The final component of the Principal Agent Theory framework is that in 
Principal-Agent relationships, problems tend to arise because of issues dealing with 
information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection or goal conflict. There can be 
information asymmetry, when one party has more or better information than the other, 
which can lead to some degree of moral hazard and/or adverse selection (Eggertsson, 
1990). Moral hazard is then when one party with the information it has, completes an 
action to the detriment of the other party or Adverse Selection when poor or bad results 
are achieved due to the type of information exchanged between the two parties 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Goal Conflict is a situation in which principals’ and agents’ desires 
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and interests concerning a task are in conflict and both prefer a different course of action 
(Petersen, 1995). 
Information Asymmetry 
It seems that both organizations are in alignment with one another and very little 
information asymmetry exists. Respondents attributed the alignment of both 
organizations to a constant flow of information and ease of finding readily available 
information online.  Expectations and consequences for not meeting expectations in 
regard to funding are documented through the CSU System Office Budget Office coded 
memos and other memorandums.  
A CSU, System - Administrator #4 stated on his interview that very little 
miscommunications exist between the two organizations. 
I think we have a pretty good balance between what we choose to give central 
direction on and what we choose to decentralize down to local level, I can’t think 
of anything off hand where we have a real miss alignment. 
 
Moral Hazard 
Participants provided very little evidence of moral hazard taking place in the CSU 
system.  If anything, a strong sentiment of collaboration was shared among participants. 
A CSU System Office administrator offered the following insight during the interview: 
we, the chancellor’s office recognizes that each of the campuses are individual 
and don’t expect them to do everything exactly the same but we do expect 
uniformity and standardization of how they approach the issue. We worked 
closely with all twenty-three campuses to achieve some consensus. 
Adverse Selection 
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There was very little evidence of adverse selection which is supported by not 
having an agency relationship in which information asymmetry exist. The two 
organizations share information readily and understand the funding process and 
corresponding expectations. The following comment from a CSU campus administrator 
reinforced this notion: 
The chancellor’s office has a good understanding of what we go through because 
again they get that feedback from us on a regular basis. 
 
Goal Conflict 
There was very little information provided to support instances where goal 
conflict existed between the CSU System office and the CSU Campus selected for this 
study.  Two respondents mentioned that other larger CSU campuses showed a desired to 
go in a different direction in terms of enrollment targets in order to better serve the 
community where the campus is situated.  
CSU, System - Administrator #5: 
I don’t think that it had to do with them deliberately seeking autonomy.  I 
think there are some campus presidents who choose, for whatever reason, 
ignore the rules and roll the dice.  Like in the case of a larger campuses did, 
they always want to be independent. 
This second comment reinforces the finding that very little goal conflict exists 
between the two organizations and the area where the conflict arises was due to campuses 
trying to better serve their surrounding communities. 
CSU, System - Administrator #4: 
So external factors do play a roll so you can have a campus that is having a lot 
of demand being driven by their demographics of their service area and they 
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may be in a service area where you’re seeing a real strong growth for example 
high school graduation, a number of students coming out of the high school in 
the area is way above the state average and that can be a factor that is making 
it hard for campus to avoid exceeding targets.  That does happen sometimes 
and we try to adjust for that.  We even adjust the target if we think it’s 
warranted, we’ve done that. 
From a descriptive viewpoint, the Principal Agent Theory framework appears to 
provide insight into the formal channels whereby expectations are communicated for this 
particular case; the common topics of moral hazard, information asymmetry, and goal 
conflict are also important to examine but case evidence suggests these negative effects 
are largely minimized in the current case under examination. 
Summary 
This chapter provides a brief historical context and organizational description of 
the California State University System Office and the California State University Campus 
as context to the case and influenced by the data analysis in chapter four. The Funding 
Story between the CSU System Office and the CSU Campus is presented and depicted 
through the accounts of the study participants and the reviewed of public documents. The 
last section provided impetus for the connection of the case with the Principal Agent 
Theory framework. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction and overview of the Study 
Previous research that seeks to understand the complexity of funding allocation 
processes between an institution and the System Office to which it reports is lacking. 
McLendon (2003) points outs that most higher education political studies examine the 
relationship between state executives and/or legislators (principals) and state higher 
education boards (agents); but he recommends that additional studies shift the level of 
analysis down to the board (principal) – university (agent) relationship. This study fulfills 
that recommendation. 
As the California State University (CSU) system struggles to fulfill its mission as 
a provider of high-quality education during an era of reduced state funding, the need to 
understand the relationship between the System Office and an institution, and how the 
institution carries out its fiscal responsibilities to the System Office increases.  A major 
focus of this study is whether that institution receives effective communication from the 
System Office and whether the institution’s perceived expectations are as the System 
Office intended. 
The 2008 economic downturn in the United States caused the State of California 
to fall into a recession and funding for state higher education soon declined. Funding for 
the California State University (CSU), like other state funded entities, significantly 
decreased.  In 2007 - 2008, the CSU managed a budget gap that exceeded $500 million. 
This gap was the net impact of nearly $1 billion in state budget cuts and increases in 
health care premiums and other required, but unfunded, expenditures. Despite tuition fee 
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revenue increasing by $593 million over the same period, state cuts and mandated costs 
far outweighed these increases, creating the half-billion dollar gap (CSU, Budget Office 
coded memo, 2010). 
During recessionary times, the CSU campuses and the CSU System Office have 
engaged in a wide range of cost-reduction actions to close the budget gap, including 
reducing enrollments by close to 20,000 students and eliminating more than 3,000 
faculty, staff and administrative positions. While these actions have allowed the CSU to 
decrease expenditures, several of the efforts have not provided long-term budget 
solutions (e.g. furloughs, delaying equipment purchases, etc.). The gap that remains to be 
closed with permanent solutions—the university’s structural deficit—is currently more 
than $130 million. This means that additional ongoing reductions in spending of this 
amount will need to be found or new ways of doing business will need to be explored 
(CSU, Budget Office coded memo, 2009; Board of Trustees Presentations 2011-2012). 
This dissertation explored the relationship between one of the California State 
University institutions and the California State University System Office it reports to 
through an examination of the funding allocation processes and expectations between the 
two entities.  In this study, Principal Agent Theory provided insight into how the 
institution carries out its duties as an agent for the principal (System Office); and how the 
System Office as a principal manages its relationship with the agent (institution). This 
chapter presents answers to each research question from evidence gathered from the case 
study, the framework and the broader literature.  The last section of the chapter includes 
implications for future practice and research. 
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Research Questions 
Research Question 1  
What expectations does the Chancellor’s Office (System Office) have of the institutions to 
which it allocates funds? 
Principal-Agent theory (PAT) explains how to best organize relationships. One 
party (the principal) determines the work and another party (the agent) undertakes the 
work with the expectation that the agent will make decisions that are in the best interest 
of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989).  In return, the agent 
and the principal enter into an agreement on how much resources will be given to the 
agent for the effort necessary to complete the task. This agreement is usually in the form 
of a contract.  The PAT framework goes on to explain that contracts can be explicit if in 
written form, implicit if in verbal form, or a combination of both types. As presented on 
Table 11, the CSU System Office and the CSU campus do have an agency relationship 
because of the existence of both  implicit (non-written) and explicit (written) agreements 
related to funding allocations based on enrollment targets, agreements for budget request 
submissions, budget planning and legislative directives.   
Table 10  
Implicit and Explicit Expectations from the CSU System Office to the CSU Campus 
Implicit Expectations Explicit Expectations 
Adjustments to enrollment targets • Enrollment targets 
• Campus budget request submissions 
• Annual student fee report - campus submission  
• System wide - budget planning assumptions for 
general funds, state university grants, and tuition 
fee revenues 
• Legislative reports and initiatives: i.e. lower 
enrollment targets 
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The main implicit agreement includes adjustments to enrollment targets and 
funding associated with those targets.  CSU campuses are expected to manage their 
enrollments throughout the beginning of each term depending on a set of agreed upon 
explicit enrollment projections with the System Office.  Participants shared that CSU 
campuses are expected to meet their enrollment targets; however, this study also found 
that the nature of the relationship between the two organizations is very collaborative and 
flexible. In instances where campuses struggled to meet enrollment target expectations, 
the System Office intervenes by determining if the campuses lack the internal expertise to 
manage enrollment or if a lack of prioritization for this expectation exists. Either way, 
participants shared that the nature of the expectations for enrollment targets remains 
flexible due to the volatility of the economic situation and recent population fluctuations 
near some of the campuses. One of the most significant findings of this study surfaced 
when participants shared that the System Office works intimately with some campuses to 
implicitly adjust enrollment target expectations that do not align with the original explicit 
agreement due to stressful or unexpected external circumstances.  Some campuses 
requested increased enrollment targets and funding associated with those targets to better 
serve the growing population surrounding the campuses, and the System Office agreed to 
the change. 
Principal Agent Theory seems to offer a suitable framework to examine the 
System Office-Campus funding relationship in instances where explicit agreements 
and/or contracts exist. The set of explicit agreements listed in Table 11 present examples 
where the System Office needs certain tasks to be performed, allocates resources to the 
campus for performing the task, and oversees the task performance. The existence of 
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explicit agreements and/or contracts serve as a vehicle for the System Office to monitor 
Campus performance which provides evidence of a Principal attempts to prevent post-
agreements opportunistic behavior by agents. 
Both of the usual conditions of agency problems, informal asymmetries and goal 
conflicts seem to be relevant to an examination of System Office-Campus funding 
relationship as it pertains to these explicit agreements.  In fact, information asymmetries 
can be considered an organic part of life inside of the relationship.  Funding related 
processes and budget work inherently are surrounded by high information asymmetries, 
as well as a range of complexities in organizational and governance structures.  As a 
theoretical concept, informational asymmetries highlight and help to formulate the 
different elements that may block or create obstacles to monitoring activities of the 
System Office.  In relation to explicit agreements, such as development of student fee 
reports information asymmetry is greater from System Office to the CSU Campuses.  The 
campuses compile data and prepare the reports based on data snapshot that the System 
Office in turn trusts the reports outputs are constructed properly and accurate. 
When making funding decisions, the assumption of goal conflicts provides 
assistance in discerning the System Office-Campus relationship tensions of goals in a 
more logical and structures manner. The concept of goal conflict can help to identify 
those Campus goals that are not parallel with the assumed System Office goals. Goal 
conflicts offer an instrument with which to analyze Campus goals like serving their 
surrounding communities in contrast with the accountability demands of the System 
Office goals of meeting a prescribed set of enrollment targets.   
139 
Overall goal conflicts and tensions discovered in this study between the System 
Office and the Campus are not static or permanent in nature, but they are different at 
different steps in the funding processes and transactions. Especially in the context of the 
current financial stringency environment, campuses may have a tendency to exaggerate 
the true willingness and capabilities of their own campus hence the reason for a very 
inclusive and complex engaging approach is set in place for funding discussions. The 
System Office is forced more or less to depend on information provided by the campuses 
themselves through their budget request process and annual report preparations and 
submissions. During these phases of the processes, goal tensions exist and are reconciled 
during the system wide budgeting planning between the Campuses and System Office.  
The System Office-Campus relationship, when examined using PAT, offers an 
opportunity to add a new dimension to PAT, as we look at the interaction between the 
System Office and one Campus. This can be seen through the elaborate budget process 
and efforts to plan a system wide budget and define a set of explicit expectations among 
the two organizations.  These explicit expectations or agreements include the submission 
of annual reports, system wide budget planning and legislative directives. Annually, CSU 
campuses are expected to prepare and report a campus budget request and a student fee 
report.  During the spring, the CSU campuses develop budget plans for the following 
year. The CSU campuses engage all campus constituents to prioritize and identify needs 
for the campus.   Then, in the early summer months, the University President will accept, 
reject or adjust the campus final recommendations and submit the final Campus Budget 
Plan to the System Office as described in Chapter 5.  
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Campus Presidents are then expected by the System Office to participate in the 
development of a system wide budget plan through the Executive Council. As the 
campuses work on developing their own campus specific budget request plans, the 
campus President is also engaged at the system level and through the Executive Council 
to develop a list of system- wide priorities for the subsequent fiscal year. Participants 
indicated that an outcome of the Executive Council is to provide an agreed upon set of 
priorities and expectations for the new fiscal year.  
This step in which Presidents [as agents] are expected to collaborate with the 
System Office [as principals] to develop expectations presents a new component not 
addressed by the Principal-Agent Theory.  This new dimension includes the notion of 
agents’ participatory engagement in setting expectations with principals. In the System 
Office -Campus relationship a modified version of PAT exists in which the set of 
“contractual” expectations are develop collaborative between the agent and principal.  In 
theory, this collaborative effort would provide assistance in eliminating some of the 
agency problems such as shirking, opportunism, and goal conflicts. 
Research Question 2 
Do the institutions perceive that the Chancellor’s Office has attached expectations to the 
funds that it allocates to the institutions? 
The principal-agent theory framework in organizational relationships deals with 
the delegation of expectations by the principal (System Office) to the agent (Campus). In 
the System Office-Campus funding relationship, an agency relationship exists since the 
Campus perceives and understands that in order to receive funding from the System 
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Office a set of expectations and tasks must be met.  The principal is the actor who has the 
resources but sometimes not the appropriate skills to complete the task.  The principal 
(System Office) then needs the agent (Campus), who accepts these appropriate resources, 
understands the expectations and is willing to further the interests of the principal.  In the 
System Office-Campus funding relationship, the expectations and tasks perceived by the 
Campus include the preparation and submissions of reports, development and 
submissions of the campus budget request, meeting agreed upon, enrollment targets and 
participation via Campus President to develop system wide priorities. As described in the 
literature review, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) suggested that government oversight 
can be divided between “police patrols” and “fire alarms.” Police patrols are centralized 
and direct oversights. In higher education, police patrols include annual reports, budget 
reports, purchase approvals, audits, and other forms of required reporting (Lane & 
Kivisto, 2008). This System Office level of oversight fits this notion of “police patrols”. 
This study found that treating the Campus as agent does not imply a hierarchical 
relationship exists.  The autonomy of the Campus as an agent is widely respected, and the 
relationship between System Office and the Campus is more of a “two-way street” where 
a certain degree of autonomy is respected on both sides.  The System Office and Campus 
take collective actions to develop some of the expectations that in turn must be met by the 
Campus as an agent. As mentioned in Research Question 1, an outcome of the Executive 
Council is an agreed upon set of priorities and expectations for the new fiscal year. 
System-wide functional groups and governance structures produce budget plans and 
priorities that are submitted through the Chancellor at the System Office to the Board of 
Trustees for approval. Once approved, these budget plans and priorities apply to the 
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entire CSU system for the next fiscal year.  The collaborative nature of the System 
Office-Campus relationship in the development of expectations (between principal and 
agent) is ignored in the PAT framework.  Additionally, the unpredictability of the 
environment creates that conditions that seem to encourage a collaborative effort between 
Principals and Agents, as they must adjust expectations. In this environment, the Campus 
may start off with one set of expectations, but environmental uncertainties change the 
ability of the agent (Campus) to accomplish the expectations and now the principal 
(System Office) and agent (Campus) must work together to figure out a reasonable 
modification to the original expectations.  Mid-year adjustments to enrollment targets 
support this finding. 
 Research question one analysis discovered the existence of collaboration in 
defining the expectations that exist; the analysis addressing research question two 
confirms this finding and provides additional insight by focusing on institutional 
perceptions.  Specifically, campus administrators perceive that expectations are 
developed collaboratively through functional groups and structures that are not accounted 
for by PAT since they are entities comprised of principals and agents.  Therefore, 
collaborative entities comprised of principals and agents, in this study, act as a 
mechanism to prevent documented problems associated with principal agent 
relationships. 
The PAT framework tends to focus on agency problems that arise from agents’ 
behaviors. PAT describes that in agency relationships, agents seek their self-interest with 
cleverness and may “shirk,” or hide information from the principal to reduce their 
workload or to be hired in the first place.  The resulting delegation could then be sub-
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optimal or even detrimental to what the principal attempted to achieve.  This is why the 
principal-agent literature discusses contract and monitoring mechanisms designed to 
avoid these problems. This study found that explicit “somewhat complete” contracts exist 
between the System Office and the Campus. The incomplete portion of the contracts 
allow for the two organizations to engage in the collaborative, consensus-seeking efforts 
of setting shared expectations and priorities, via functional groups and governance 
structures comprised of representatives of both the principal and agent. The System 
Office monitors the work of the Campus via a participatory monitoring mechanism rather 
than the traditionally described PAT linear concepts of a Principal monitoring the agent. 
The analysis also seems to indicate that from the institutions’ perception, the 
existence of other types of principals (State Legislature) and agents (Other CSU 
Campuses) further encourages the System Office and the Campus to collaborate with 
each other as illustrated in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Illustration of Multiple Principal - Multiple Agent Collaboration in the System 
Office-Campus Relationship drawn from PAT. The dashed arrows indicate the flow of the 
contract components: “higher order “principal oversee funding allocations and set 
expectations and agents report information on set expectations and perform/report tasks. The 
intersections show the collaborative nature of the transactions between the System Office, the 
Campus and the other CSU campuses. 
 
Other CSU Campuses 
(Competing/Resource 
Agent) 
Campus (Agent) 
System Office 
(Principal/Agent) 
State Legislature 
(“Higher Order” 
Principal) 
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This study revealed that in the System Office-Campus relationship, multiple 
principals (State Legislature) and multiple agents (Campus academic departments, 
campus divisions and other CSU campuses) exist and impact the relationship and 
expectations set forth for the Campus as an agent. In Chapter 3, through the analysis of 
the interview data, the other CSU campuses surfaced as “competing agents” denoting 
instances where agents are in competition for resources with other agents who interact 
with the same principal.  However, further analysis reveals that the other CSU campuses 
also serve as resources to the smaller campuses. 
Organizationally, the presence of multiple and competing agents reduces the 
possibility of shirking since the Campus must react in line with other agents’ behaviors 
(Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Ferejohns, 1993).On the other hand, the presence of 
multiple principals adds to the complexity of the relationship and makes it difficult for 
the Campus as an agent to know and meet the expectations of all principals involved. The 
two organizations share a culture that the California State legislature is a multiple 
principal and plays a significant authoritative role both to the System Office and directly 
to the Campus. Both organizations seem to believe that they are required to report and 
address fiscal matters directly to the California State Legislature, including new and/or 
on-going priorities of serving the citizens of California via enrollment targets and/or 
through the implementation of politically driven budget agendas. This existence of a 
"higher order" principal (The Legislature) acts as an incentive or “force” that encourages 
collaboration among the principal (system Office) and the agent (Campus) and this 
collaboration eliminates the traditional problems associated with PAT.  
Research Question 3 
146 
What insights does Principal Agent Theory provide about the relationship between the 
Chancellor’s office and the institutions with respect to funding allocation as it flows from 
the Chancellor’s Office to the institution? 
The foundation of principal-agent theory is based on economic assumptions, with 
the relationship between the principal (System Office) and the agent (Campus) defined by 
the contract. The principal engages with the agent to perform a task, and relationship 
problems are minimized to the extent that shirking and slippage are minimized. In this 
study, Principal Agent Theory assisted in confirming that agreements exist between the 
System Office and the Campus.  The types of agreements that are explicit (written 
format) between the System Office and Campus are not entirely prescriptive and may 
change over time, depending on conditions that are external to both the principal and the 
agent.  The influence of changing external conditions, as they may bear on explicit 
agreements, facilitates collaboration between the two organizations as they seek 
consensus.  The changing external conditions actually led to one implicit agreement—
adjustments to enrollment targets, which is at the core of the consensus seeking process 
between the System Office and Campus.  
The PAT lens also assisted in discovering the tensions and nature of the external 
forces that pressure the System Office-Campus relationship.  These external forces 
include subjects outside of the Principal-Agent relationship that for this study were 
labeled as multiple principals (State Legislature), multiple agents (academic departments 
and divisions inside of the Campus), and competing agents (other CSU campuses). 
Additionally, tension from students growing demands and demographics changes 
pressures the enrollment target expectations between System Office and the Campus, 
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requiring enrollment adjustments. However, PAT does not provide further insights into 
how these external pressures and tensions affect the principal-agent contractual 
relationship since PAT is used to describe dyadic relationships.   
Research Question 3.a.  
From the principal (Chancellor’s Office) and agent (institution) perspective, does a 
contract with respect to funding exist between the two organizations?  
 The System Office (principal) and the Campus (agent) both perceived that there are 
contractual agreements with respect to funding between the two organizations. The 
Campus understands the timing and nature of the agreements related to budget request 
submissions, budget planning, legislative directives and enrollment targets.  As discussed 
in research question one, the Campus behaves as an agent in that the reports are based on 
data that the Campus gathers and prepares, and the System Office in turn trusts the report 
outputs (task) are developed accurately. 
The System Office also perceives and understands that contracts exist between the 
two organizations. Furthermore, the System Office expects that such agreements are 
fulfilled timely and accurately. In Chapter 4, the case study event map demonstrated that 
explicit timelines and expectations the Campus as an agent must fulfill with the System 
Office are present in the relationship. These System Office timelines and expectations are 
published annually through the fiscal calendar, budgeting reporting submissions and 
instructions and fiscal year budget coded memos. The existence of these written 
documents (explicit agreements) provides further evidence that the contractual 
relationship is well established, thus making the expectations clearer for the Campus 
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(agent) and the System Office (principal) and enabling the Agent to timely and accurately 
fulfill their duties. 
Research Question 3.b. 
From the principal (Chancellor’s Office) perspective, are the agents (institutions) 
fulfilling their contracts?  
The System Office works closely with all twenty-three campuses to ensure that 
they can fulfill their agreements, specifically in terms of enrollment levels.  This study 
found that in the System Office-Campus relationship, an implicit agreement exists when 
dealing with fluctuations to enrollment levels. When enrollment target agreements are not 
fulfilled, the System Office intervenes early on by requesting midyear enrollment level 
reports. These enrollment reports allow the System Office to assess whether the Campus 
lacks the in house expertise on how to manage enrollment, whether external factors are 
affecting the situation or if an oversight exists.  The System Office as a principal is 
assisting the Campus as its Agent with the task of identifying where roadblocks may get 
in the way of the Agent to fulfill the promised enrollment targets. In the PAT framework, 
this assistance of identifying problems to accomplish a promised task by the Principal 
with the agent is not accounted for.  
In addition, once the issue affecting the campus is recognized, the System Office 
may offer assistance to establish enrollment management efforts or it may evoke the 
assistance from another CSU campus that possesses the expertise to successfully 
implement an enrollment management effort. This further assistance, which in terms is 
collaboration, happens because in the unique case of System Office-Campus relationship, 
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it is the System Office who has access to other agents (other CSU campuses) who may 
possess the expertise that the principal has formal authority over, or access to resources 
that may be helpful (i.e. hiring a consultant) to help the agent (Campus) complete the 
promised task. 
Gerth (2010) wrote that system level governance and oversight takes center stage 
on a regular basis through efforts of establishing better programs for efficiencies and 
effectiveness and in addition to oversight, the system office provides centralized services 
to institutions within the system. For this study, PAT provides a relevant framework in 
understanding that the System Office (principal) monitors the contract with its agent 
(Campuses); however, the System Office (principal) collaborates or, as Gerth suggests, 
provides a service to assist the Agent in successfully completing their task which is a new 
dimension to PAT. 
Additionally, in the System Office-Campus relationship, the completion of the 
task is not as simple and linear as PAT suggests – the System Office understands that 
various issues may complicate the accurate completion of the task, and perhaps it is the 
unique time period under which this study was conducted (extensive budget cuts) that 
increases this understanding and willingness to collaborate, by the System Office. 
Research Question 3.c. 
From the agent’s perspective, are they fulfilling their contractual duty?  
The Campus as an agent fulfills agreements related to reporting submissions, 
budgeting planning and enrollment level by meeting a schedule of requirements set by 
the System Office in collaboration with the Campuses. However, by and large, principal-
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agent theory tends to assume agents have an innate tendency to seek autonomy from 
organizational rules, to minimize the burden of discharging responsibilities, and to hoard 
rather than pass through information (Frederickson & Smith, 2003). In the System 
Office-Campus relationship, this study found that the comprehensive approach to funding 
in the CSU System promotes collaboration and inclusion of all constituents and thus 
alleviates some of the inherent agency problems such as shirking or agents’ seeking 
autonomy. Since the Campus feels like it can go to the principal (system Office) to seek 
additional resources (e.g. help from other campuses, consultants, or experts from the 
System Office), there is a reduced incentive to shirk, and thus the openness to 
collaboration reduces some of the agency problems typically associated with PAT. 
Implications and Recommendations for Practice 
This study identifies that the transactions exchanged between the System Office-
Campus, within the Campus (multiple agents), from other CSU campuses (competing 
agents), the State Legislature (higher power principal), and market forces contributed to a 
healthy bureaucratic process between the two organizations. The comprehensive and 
inclusive bureaucratic process has a positive impact in providing forums to deal with 
fiscal matters. This understanding of the System Office-Campus relationship can help 
other organizations to become more aware of the structures that need to be in place to 
enable successful collaborations. Likewise, understanding the complexities of the 
relationship provides a better basis for planning who to communicate with and the type of 
communications internal and external of each organization are needed for a successful 
decision-making process. 
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Practitioners should be aware that in a System Office-Campus Relationship 
explicit and implicit agreements exist as a vehicle to monitor the agent (Campus).  
Explicit (written) agreements are still an important part of the principal-agent 
relationship, because they spell out expectations. However, when principal and agent 
work together long enough, implicit agreements develop over time, and these are, in this 
case study, healthy for the development of collaboration and trust. Collaboration and trust 
are built through mutual exchange, so System Office and campuses of any type might 
conceivably avoid agency problems by together problem solving when budget or 
enrollment challenges arise. Regardless of the type of agreement: explicit (written) or 
implicit (non-written), there should be some flexibility for the organizations to deal with 
external factors that may arise during the course of the decision-making process, as is the 
case in difficult years faced with budget cuts. 
Due to the complex nature of the funding transactions between the System Office-
Campus agency relationship, issues of information asymmetries and goal conflicts are to 
be expected. In funding matters, the complexity of the subject enhances the environment 
to be more prone to information asymmetries. Therefore, an inclusive and well-thought 
out communication and decision-making process can compensate for this known problem 
of information asymmetries. When dealing with a System Office to Campus relationship, 
the issue of goal conflicts are not static issues and arise from one organization (agent) 
attempting to fulfill its own mission to its constituents while remaining accountable to the 
other organization (Principal). 
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Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
These findings have revealed several areas that are in need of additional research. 
This study would be strengthened by expanding the range of the research design to 
incorporate a multi-campus case study, where more than one campus at the California 
State University System is examined. There are some limitations associated with the use 
of the case study method, including the inability to generalize from the findings of a 
single case study, some selectivity in the individuals interviewed, and the subjective 
interpretation by the researcher. A multi-site case study with an expanded list of 
interviewees can improve both internal and external validity, making the results 
generalizable to more than just the one case, and therefore providing stronger 
implications for the results and theory.  The reliability of the study can also be improved 
by replicating the results at multiple sites (Yin, 2009). Also, conducting cross-case 
analysis can yield insights which may not have surfaced during this study of one campus. 
From the PAT perspective, further research is also warranted to specifically 
evaluate the reality of multiple agents, how the internal structures of the Campus 
(multiple agents) affect the System Office-Campus funding relationship.  There is a need 
to examine the relationships and influences from academic and administrative units 
within the Campus in order to determine if the units believe and understand the 
expectations and the resources connected to the expectations. Such research could expose 
additional insights into the complex notion of having the campus units behave as multiple 
agents influencing the relationship between the System Office and the Campus. 
With a similar approach, conducting research to examine how external structures 
and subjects, such as the State Legislature (multiple principals), affect the System Office-
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Campus relationship should follow. It would be important to study the actual dynamics 
that exist between and among those multiple principals that share a common principal 
and explore how does the inter-organizational dynamic between multiple agents who 
share a common principal, for example, influence the incentives to shirk, or slippage? 
How does that dynamic affect individual collaborative processes with the principal?  
Further research should consider if adequate emphasis has been given to non-
economic considerations, such as cultural, social, psychological, and political factors, 
since PAT does not account for non-economic forces. Research should include other 
organizational theories and/or frameworks besides the principal-agent theory to explore 
issues of change management and its impact to the organizations. 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examined the funding relationship of one Campus and the 
System Office it reports to, incorporating the lens of the Principal Agent Theory as a 
framework. This chapter provides responses to each research question based on the 
study’s data analysis and findings. Finally, the chapter concludes with implications for 
practice and by recommending research for further exploration.  
Additionally, the results of this study can serve as a reference for college 
researchers, organizations, finance administrators, policy analysts, and state legislators to 
gain a better understanding of how the relationship between System Offices and 
institutions can be enhanced to more effectively and efficiently utilize public resources. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Protocol for Finance Staff Interviews at the Institution 
 
1. Does any contract/agreement with respect to funding allocations from the system 
office exist between the system office and CSU - Campus?  
a. Do you feel the agreement includes all the system office fiscal 
expectations? 
2. How does the system office communicate fiscal goals and expectations to 
CSUDH? 
a. How are fiscal goals, expectations and changes communicated to 
CSUDH? 
b. Describe expectations connected to system office fiscal allocations to the 
institution? 
c. Do you feel CSU - Campus understands the Chancellor’s/system office 
expectations?  
d. In what areas has CSU - Campus met expectations as it pertains to using 
the funds it received, as allocated from the systems office? 
e. Are there areas within funding allocation, whereby you feel the system 
office and CSU - Campus are not aligned?   
  
155 
Appendix B 
Interview Protocol for Finance Staff Interviews at the System Office 
 
1. Does any contract/agreement with respect to funding allocations from the 
system office exist between the system office and CSU - Campus?  
a. Do you feel the agreement includes all the system office fiscal 
expectations? 
2. How does the system office communicate fiscal goals and expectations to 
CSU - Campus? 
a. How are fiscal goals, expectations and changes communicated to CSU 
- Campus? 
b. Describe expectations connected to system office fiscal allocations to 
the institution? 
c. Do you feel CSU - Campus understands the Chancellor’s/system 
office expectations?  
d. In what areas has CSU - Campus met expectations as it pertains to 
using the funds it received, as allocated from the systems office? 
e. Are there areas within funding allocation, whereby you feel the system 
office and CSU - Campus are not aligned?   
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Appendix C  
IRB Approval 
 
 
Social/Behavioral IRB –Review 
Notice of Excluded Activity 
DATE:  April 23, 2012 
TO: Dr. Mario Martinez, Educational Leadership 
FROM: Office of Research Integrity – Human Subjects 
  RE: Notification of IRB Action 
 Protocol Title: A Case Study Exploring How a Public, Four Year 
University Interacts with the System Office it Reports to 
 Protocol# 1204-4121M 
________________________________________________________________________ 
This memorandum is notification that the project referenced above has been reviewed as 
indicated in Federal regulatory statutes 45CFR46.   
 
The protocol has been reviewed and deemed excluded from IRB review.  It is not in need 
of further review or approval by the IRB. 
 
Any changes to the excluded activity may cause this project to require a different level of 
IRB review.  Should any changes need to be made, please submit a Modification Form. 
 
If you have questions or require any assistance, please contact the Office of Research 
Integrity – Human Subjects at IRB@unlv.edu or call 895-2794. 
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Appendix D 
California State University – System Office –Organizational Chart 
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Appendix E 
California State University – System Office – Budget Office – Organizational Chart 
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Appendix F 
California State University, Campus – Finance and Administration Division – 
Organizational Chart 
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Appendix G  
Location Map of the 23 California State University Campuses 
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Appendix H 
Coded Interview Transcription 
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Appendix I 
Budget Office Coded Memo
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Appendix J 
System Office - Budget Office Legislative Reports 
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Appendix K 
Data Analysis Coding Matrix 
Definitions Research Questions Preset 
Codes 
Standard 
Categories 
Principal – Agent Theory One party (the 
principal) determines the work and another 
party (the agent) undertakes the work with 
the expectation that the agent will make 
decisions that are in the best interest of the 
principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). 
1. What expectation does the 
System Office (principal) have 
of the institutions (agent) to 
which it allocates funds? 
Contract Exist 
doesn’t exist 
Contract 
The agent and the principal make an 
agreement (contract) on how much 
payment or resources will be given to the 
agent for the effort necessary to complete 
the task. This agreement is usually in the 
form of a contract. 
2. What insights does principal-
agent theory provide about the 
relationship between the 
System Office and the 
institutions, with respect to 
funding allocation as it flows 
from the chancellor office to 
the institution? 
a. From the principal 
(System Office) and agent 
(institution) perspective, 
does a contract with 
respect to funding exist 
between the two 
organizations? 
Contract Exist  
doesn’t exist 
Implicit / Explicit 
The contract and/or agreement in the 
principal-agent relationship is either 
explicit (written document) or implicit (an 
oral agreement of understanding) and can 
vary in detail. 
b. If a contract exists, from 
the principal (System 
Office) and the agent 
(institution) perspective 
does a written (explicit) or 
verbal (implicit) contract 
exist? If a written contract 
exists, are there any 
implicit components? 
Contract 
Type 
Explicit 
Combination 
Implicit 
Complete/ Incomplete 
The variation in detail refers to either 
complete contracts attempting to include 
all tasks, activities and contingencies or, 
contracts that are incomplete regarding 
how much to specify for every task, 
activities and potential contingencies. 
c. If a contract exists, from 
the principal (System 
Office) and the agent 
(institution) perspective, 
are there components 
missing from the contract? 
Contract 
Detail 
Complete 
Combination 
Incomplete 
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Information asymmetry 
Assumes that agents have an innate 
tendency to seek autonomy from 
organizational rules, to minimize the 
burden of discharging responsibilities and 
to hoard rather than pass through 
information which is considered power 
(Frederickson & Smith, 2003) 
3. Do the institutions perceive that 
the System Office has attached 
expectations to the funds that it 
allocates to the institutions? 
a. From the principal 
(System Office) 
perspective, are the agents 
(institutions) fulfilling 
their contracts? 
b. From the agent’s 
(institutions) perspective, 
are they fulfilling their 
contractual duty? 
Information 
Asymmetry 
High 
medium 
low 
Moral hazard (shirking)  
The principal cannot be sure if the agent 
has put forth maximal effort (Eisenhardt, 
1989) 
Moral 
Hazard 
 
High  
medium 
Low 
 
Adverse selection  
Arises from the principal’s uncertainty 
regarding the agent’s true abilities and 
intentions (Bergen, 1992, p. 6)  
Adverse 
Selection 
High  
medium 
Low 
Goal Conflicts  
This is the situation in which principals 
and agents desires and interests concerning 
the task are in conflict and both prefer a 
different course of actions (Petersen, 
1995) 
Goal 
Conflict 
Align 
somewhat 
align 
not align 
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